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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation presents the results of a series of studies into the effects of welfare policies on 
individual well-being. The research objectives are to examine empirical evidence of how national 
policies affect the objective and subjective well-being of individuals, and to fill the gap between 
policies at the macro level and individuals at the micro level. This will enable us to further our 
understanding of the effects of policies to promote a more dignified approach toward the treatment 
of real life people. This thesis consists of three chapters that fall under the broad banner of welfare 
policies and well-being. 
The first essay, The Well-Being Effects of Targeted Cash Transfer Programs for the Elderly: 
Evidence from Natural Experiments in South Korea, aims to examine the effects of targeted cash 
transfers with a cutoff for lower economic status on objective and subjective well-being, and to 
investigate the possible mechanism behind the program. Examining two types of exogenous policy 
changes, coverage expansion and benefit increase, results clearly show that these cause a crowding 
out of private transfers, compensating the loss of private transfer to household income, lower life 
satisfaction, and higher depression of the treated. Focusing on the stigmatizations associated with 
targeted cash transfer programs, a dignified targeted cash transfer through a non-face-to-face 
application and a positive media campaign to deliver the policy intention to the public are suggested. 
The second essay, Unemployment and Subjective Well-Being: The Role of Unemployment Benefit in 
South Korea, examines the comprehensive effects of unemployment on subjective well-being and 
the role of unemployment benefits as a public mediator. By examining exogenous entry to 
unemployment due to plant closure or layoff, it is found that there are negative spillover effects of 
unemployment on the life satisfaction of the unemployed and their spouses with noticeable gender 
differences. Unemployment benefit buffers the overall negative effects of unemployment, making it 
near-zero. 
  
The third essay,  Individual Perceptions toward the Social Systems, Social Spending and Subjective 
Well-Being in Europe, is inspired by previous literature showing that welfare state efforts measured 
by social spending have a near-zero effect on individual experienced utility, or life satisfaction. To 
fill the gap between individuals and welfare states, the moderating effects of individual perceptions 
toward the social system are examined. Focusing on European countries, 2002-2015, 
multidimensional social perceptions mediate the near-zero effect of social spending. This implies 
that policy-makers should consider how much people trust and perceive the social system to 
maximize the effects of welfare states. 
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Chapter 1  
 
The Well-Being Effects of Targeted Cash Transfer 
Programs for the Elderly: Evidence from Natural 
Experiments in South Korea 
 
1. Introduction 
South Korea, ranked as 11th in GDP in the world (IMF, 2018), is notorious for having the highest 
poverty rate of the elderly. About one in two elderly Koreans is poor (OECD, 2018) and this leads the 
Korean government to introduce policy interventions to alleviate the issue. According to Yeo & Jeon 
(2017, p.101), however, the relative poverty rate of the elderly in 2006 was 43.8% including single 
households, and in 2016 that increased to 46.7% in spite of policy efforts. This leads to a question of 
‘what is happening?’ 
A number of studies show the positive effects of targeted cash transfers (TCT) on multiple aspects 
of lives by focusing on the policy changes in expansion of coverage or increase in benefit. Dahl & 
Lochner (2012) claimed that the Earned Income Tax Credit in the U.S. improves children’s 
achievements. Moreover, Aid to Families with Dependent Children in the U.S. crowds out private 
assistance and private transfers (Rosenzwig & Wolpin, 1994; Schoeni, 1996), Mother’s Pension 
positively influences children’s long-run outcomes (Aizer et al., 2016), an increase in benefit of 
Disability Insurance reduces labor supply (Gruber, 2000), Unemployment Insurance crowds out 
spousal labor supply (Cullen & Gruber, 2000) and saving (Engen & Gruber, 2001), increased amounts 
of Canada’s Child Tax Benefit leads to positive children’s outcomes (Milligan & Stabile, 2011) and 
leads to higher consumption of direct education inputs and everyday items and reduces consumptions 
on risky behavior (Jones, Milligan & Stabile, 2018).  
TCT for the elderly in poverty shows different impact patterns across outcomes and regional 
backgrounds. TCT for the elderly increases the health of granddaughters living together but does not 
change that of grandsons in South Africa (Duflo, 2003). It does, however, decrease private transfers in 
the same country (Jensen, 2003). In Korea, additional TCT due to the coverage expansion in 2008 
improves not only the affordability of basic subsistence, such as heating and nutritious meals, but also 
financial satisfaction (Shin & Do, 2015). It also leads to higher gross income, consumption and lowers 
poverty incidences of beneficiaries (Lee, Ku & Shon, 2017). In China, however, the means-tested 
Minimum Living Standard Scheme decreases the level of subjective well-being of beneficiaries (Qi & 
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Wu, 2018). Most studies on the effects of TCT for the elderly show a mix of negative and positive 
effects on the well-being of beneficiaries.  
In this study, the effects of TCT for the elderly in South Korea, especially on objective and 
subjective well-being (WB), will be highlighted in that TCT may both contribute to individuals in 
poverty to reduce the gap between their income and the poverty line (Lee, Ku & Shon, 2017), and 
may also decrease private transfers (Jensen, 2003). In the first instance, TCT helps beneficiaries to 
escape from being in poverty that decreases life satisfaction and increases depression through less 
risk-taking and time-discounting (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). For the second part, reduction in private 
transfers may discourage reciprocal support between elderly parents adult children, embodied in the 
form of private transfers, which increases the life satisfaction of elderly parents (Kim & Kim, 2003; 
Lee et al., 2014; Lee, 2017). 
Since the high poverty rate of the elderly in Korea has become a serious social issue over recent 
decades, TCT for the elderly in South Korea has undergone changes in policy. Significant changes 
include expanding coverage of the policy up to 70% of low-income elderly in 2008, and the benefit 
payments of the policy were doubled in 2014. Therefore, not only do these assist the normative need 
for TCT for the elderly in Korea, these two exogenous changes in policy enable us to examine the 
effects of the policy changes on the WB of the beneficiaries. First, coverage expansion leads to 
various outcomes in the literature. Expansion in coverage of Medicaid in the U.S crowded out private 
medical insurance (Cutler & Gruber, 1996; Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999). Children Care Service, 
however, is an example of unexpected lower quality of service due to abrupt expansion without 
preparation of delivery system (Baker, Gruber & Milligan, 2008), and coverage expansion of 
Canadian Maternity Leave resulted in more maternal labor supply and crowded out unlicensed home-
based care (Baker & Milligan, 2010). Second, the benefit increase also guides policy outcomes in 
studies. To be specific, Disability Insurance in Canada is shown to be related to labor force 
nonparticipation (Gruber, 2000) and Old Age Pension in South Africa lowers private transfers from 
adult children (Jensen, 2003). 
In these normative and methodological lines, this study aims to examine the effect of TCT for the 
elderly on objective and subjective WB through possible causes, and to compare the two policy 
changes of coverage expansion and benefit increase. Therefore, this study starts with two questions: 
First, how do different types of targeted cash transfers affect both the objective and subjective WB of 
the population? Second, which mechanisms explain the impact of the TCT on the elderly? In order to 
get answers to these questions, this study will be organized as follows; in the second section, outlines 
of TCT for the elderly in South Korea will be addressed, focusing on the two types of policy changes 
and the process of applying to and benefitting from the policy. In the third and fourth section, the data 
and model to extract the impact of policy changes on objective and subjective WB of the elderly will 
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be addressed. In the fifth section, the basic result will be provided, and robustness check results will 
be presented in the sixth section. In the seventh section, possible mechanisms will be tested and a 
falsification test will be shown in the eighth section. The ninth section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Outlines of Targeted Cash Transfer Programs for the Elderly in South Korea 
A comprehensive social security scheme for a guaranteed income of the elderly in South Korea, in 
theory, comprises multi-pillar systems: National Pension and Social Pension.
1
 As can be seen in table 
1, National Pension (NP), based on contribution through employment, provides contributors aged 65 
or over with benefits with a replacement rate of about 45% of mean earnings of individual men. Since 
NP is financed through its own fund, the scheme sets distinguished service delivery systems. For 
Social Pension (SP), Korea has developed various forms and titles of policies, such as the Old-Age 
Allowance in 1991, Old-Age Pension in 1998, Basic Old-Age Pension (BOAP) in 2008 and Basic 
Pension (BP) in 2014. SP is distinguished from NP in that it targets low-income earners aged 65 or 
over, financed by general tax revenue, enabling us to regard SP as TCT in South Korea. The 
replacement rate of SP is known to account about 10% of 3-year average earnings of the insured of 
the NP and its delivery depends on general administrative systems of Community Service Centers and 
NP provincial centers. 
 
Table 1 National Pension and Social Pension in South Korea 
 National Pension Social Pension (BOAP, BP) 
Eligibility Contributors aged 65 or over  
through employment or self-decision 
Those aged 65 or over who earn under 70% of 
Administrative Calculated Income 
Replacement 
Rate 
45.1% of individual earnings, 
multiple of mean for men 
10% of 3-year average earnings  
of the insured of the NP 
Finance National Pension Fund Tax Revenue 
Delivery 
System 
National Pension Service and Provincial Centers Community Service Center and NP Provincial 
Centers 
Note: Replacement rate of National Pension reflects relative level of benefit to the measurable livelihood.  
Source: OECD (2017a, pp.106-107) Pension at a Glance 2017, Paris: OECD Publishing; OECD (2017b) Pension at a Glance 
2017: Country Profile-Korea, Paris: OECD Publishing. 
 
For detailed backgrounds to understand the mechanism of how TCT influences individuals’ 
objective and subjective well-being, it is worthwhile to take a look at the transition of the TCT for the 
elderly in Korea as is seen in table 2. Since the high level of poverty rate of the elderly has been a 
                                           
1
 The Korean government has implemented a social assistance program, or the National Basic Livelihood Security (NBLS) 
for the poor who earn under 30~50% of median household income. The principle of less eligibility of NBLS counts the 
amount of TCT benefit and deducts the benefit from NBLS benefit, separating the two cash transfer programs. Thus, this 
study does not consider NBLS as one of pillars of old-age income security programs in Korea. 
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serious social issue, the initial form of TCT for the elderly started in 1991 with the title of Old-Age 
Allowance. It targeted those aged over 70 in 1991 and the coverage expanded up to those aged over 65 
in 1997. However, the eligibility of the policy was strictly open only to beneficiaries of social 
assistance, which are the poorest individuals in Korea, leading its take-up rate to only account for only 
3.4% in 1991 and 8.5% in 1997 of the total elderly. The amount of benefit provided was KRW 35,000 
a month for those aged 65-79 and KRW 50,000 for those over 80. In July of 1998, the TCT expanded 
its coverage up to old low-income earners aged 65 and over, increasing its take-up rate to 18.0%. The 
amount of benefit, however, was decreased to KRW 30,000 a month, compensating for the effects of 
the coverage expansion.  
 
Table 2 The Policy transition of targeted cash transfers for the elderly in Korea 
 Old-Age Allowance Old-Age Pension Basic Old-Age 
Pension (BOAP) 
Basic Pension 
(BP) 
Period 1991 for over 70,  
1997 for over 65 
1998. Jul. 2008. Jan. 2014. Jul. 
Eligibility Over 70 (65), 
beneficiaries of social 
assistance 
Over 65, low-income Over 65, under 70% 
of Administrative 
Calculated Income 
Over 65, under 70% 
of Administrative 
Calculated Income 
Take-up rate  
(of total elderly) 
3.4% (1991) 
~8.5% (1997) 
18.0% (1998) 
~12.6% (2007) 
57.2% (2008) 
~65.1% (2014. Jun.) 
66.8% (2014. Jul.) 
~67.7% (2017) 
Benefit (1997) KRW 35,000 
for the aged 65-79, 
50,000 for those aged 
over 80 
(1997. Jul.) KRW 
30,000 for a low-
income earner 
KRW 84,000 at 
maximum 
KRW 200,000 at 
maximum 
Main Changes in 
Policy 
Introduction as a 
complementary policy 
for national pension 
Expansion in coverage 
and decrease in benefit 
Expansion in target 
population and 
increase in benefit 
Increase in benefit 
Note: The take-up rate of Basic Pension in 2017 is extracted from Financial Statistics (stat.nabo.go.kr/fn03-99.jsp) on 12. 
April. 2018. For a couple, the benefit is doubled with deductions based on the economies of scale within households. 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare. (2016, p.240). The 70 Years History of Health and Welfare Policy: Social Policy. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare; Kim. (1997, p.26). Introduction of the Old-Age Pension and Policy Recommendations. 
Health and Social Welfare Forum. Vol.13. 
 
Those policies could not solve the problem of the high level of poverty rate of the elderly, so the 
newly titled TCT, Basic Old-Age Pension (BOAP) was introduced by the democratic government 
with coverage expansion of up to 70% of Administrative Calculated Income, considering both income 
and household assets, and increased the amount of benefit provided up to KRW 84,000 a month for a 
household, so its take-up rate increased to about 60% of total elderly. The difference between the 
cutoff and the actual take-up rate is due to omitted information on application forms, a reporting error 
in the dataset and the psychological cost of stigma (Liu, Zhang & Zhang, 2005; Stuber & Schlesinger, 
2006). After the presidential election in 2012 and the associated political debates, in 2014 the Korean 
government decide to change the title of the TCT to Basic Pension (BP) and to double the benefit of 
the TCT to up to KRW 200,000 a month, keeping eligibility to those aged 65 and over with under 70% 
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of the Administrative Calculated Income. These two big changes in TCT, the coverage expansion in 
2008 and the benefit increase in 2014, enables us to study the policy effects on the outcomes of the 
elderly. 
Returning to the policies, both BOAP in 2008 and BP in 2014 utilize the concept of Calculated 
Income (CI), considering household income and assets (Ministry of Health and Welfare). CI follows 
particular equations by adding Evaluated Income, including wage, business income, asset income, and 
public transfers, and Converted Income of Asset, calculated by the sum of the general assets, financial 
assets, cars and donated assets of adult children, and debt. The difference between the policy 
guidelines of CI in 2008 and CI in 2014 is the presence of a deduction for wage and for housing. In 
order for there to be equity between beneficiaries of NP and those of SP, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare adopted the principle of subsidiarity, so the share of BOAP and BP benefit is deducted in NP, 
which is greater than the cutoff of the CI by BOAP and BP 
To apply for BOAP and BP, applicants should follow the process of enrollment in figure 1. The 
eligible senior needs to visit a Community Service Center or National Pension Service (NPS) Center 
(only for those beneficiaries of NP) and to have a face-to-face interview with civil servants with 
application documents containing personal information about household characteristics and economic 
details regarding income and assets. Then the government conducts a means-test, considering income 
and asset factors of the eligible elderly and of adult children with the duty of support and the 
Community Service Center delivers the announcement of the determination of final eligibility and the 
amount of money for transfers. In this process, the face-to-face interview may cause stigma of the 
eligible beneficiaries in that they are required to fill forms about their detailed information of income 
and assets of not only themselves but also their household members, and civil servants may ask to 
check if their report is correct or not by calling to related persons or checking administrative records 
in front of the applicants. For the benefit increase in 2014, the policy changes occurred automatically 
and beneficiaries can identify the policy change through their bank account without being aware of 
others. 
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Figure 1 Process of Application, BOAP and BP 
 
 
After the application process above, the amount of benefit of BOAP and BP only accounts for 11.6% 
(=KRW 84,000/725,307) of the relative poverty line in 2008 and 21.3% (=KRW 200,000/939,466) of 
that in 2014. Recalling the fact of the high level of poverty rate of the elderly in South Korea, the 
benefit generosity of BOAP and BP, respectively, cannot be said to be enough to compensate for the 
poverty lines. 
 
Table 3 Relative poverty lines in South Korea, 2007-2015  
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Poverty line 695,919 725,307 737,568 784,515 832,735 885,415 916,263 939,466 967,374 
Note: The unit of KRW. Relative poverty line in South Korea is measured as 50% of median of monthly household 
disposable income, which includes wages, business income, asset income, private transfer and public transfers and deducted 
tax. Korean Statistics Information Service provides individualized income information by dividing the total household 
disposable income by the square root of the number of household members. 
Source of monthly household disposable income: Korean Statistical Information Service 
(http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1L6E001&conn_path=I3extracted on 14.Oct.2018) 
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3. Data 
In this study, to examine the effects of the coverage expansion in 2008 and the benefit increase in 
2014, the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KoWePS) conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and 
Social Affairs will be utilized. The survey started with 7,072 households in 2006 and has kept 4,560 
households up to 2017 with about a 35% attrition rate. In 2012, the KoWePs added a sample of 1,800 
households, leaving a total sample size of 6,723 households in 2017. Not only household information, 
but KoWePS also collects information of household members aged 15 and over. The sample covers 16 
provinces nationwide using ‘Stratified Double Sampling’ in phase 1, taking a sample of 517 
enumeration districts from the 90% of the 2005 Census, and in phase 2 by extracting 3,500 general 
and low-income families from the previous survey, respectively, excluding Sejong-Si where is a 
province launched in 2012 as a new administrative city. Since KoWePS collects lagged income 
information using a recall method, I use income information in the next year dataset to match time. 
To get rid of possible statistical noise in the sample, two data restrictions were utilized. First, the 
main data is restricted to those aged 66 and older to identify the policy effects of the target population, 
excluding those aged 65 who get a right to apply for TCT due to the age condition. Second, the top 20% 
of the CI is excluded to eliminate higher income earners who do not belong in the target population of 
the TCT. This restriction is mainly based on that TCT is designed as an additional cash transfer 
program for the elderly with under 70% of the CI, which is the summation of evaluated income (EI) 
and converted income of assets (CIA). Yearly formulas of CI provided by the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare are a set of guidelines using the information of individuals and their adult children. 
Household level and their adult children’s information may mislead to divide the population into two 
groups below and above the cutoff, allowing a generous 80% of cutoff in this study. Thus, those aged 
66 and over with under 80% of the CI comprise the final restricted sample. 
Measurements of individual well-being (WB) have two categories: objective WB and subjective 
WB. For objective WB, household disposable income is the key dependent variable. Since disposable 
household income includes public transfers, benefit from TCT is highly correlated with the changes in 
policy benefit status which are the target mechanism of this study. Thus, adjusted household 
disposable income which is the difference between disposable household income and TCT benefit is 
used as an alternative to the initial indicator in appendix A3. 
As a factor of household income of the elderly, private transfers from adult children are also used. 
The unit of the two objective WB measurements is KRW 10,000 per month and both are adjusted by 
the yearly consumer price index announced by the Korea Statistical Information Service 
(http://kosis.kr). Since these economic statuses may be endogenous to the size of the household due to 
the economies of scale within the household, the number of family members is used as one of the 
control variables. The two economic statuses are used in the values of a log, after imputation with 1 if 
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it is less than 1 since disposable household income includes business income which can be negative 
and private transfers can be 0.  
Life satisfaction and depression are used as positive and negative aspects of subjective WB, 
respectively. Life satisfaction is measured on a 0-5 scale as above with a question of “Considering 
overall aspects of life, how satisfied are you with your life?”, indicating 1 for ‘very dissatisfied’, 2 for 
‘dissatisfied’, 3 for ‘neutral’, 4 for ‘somewhat satisfied, and 5 for ‘very satisfied’. Depression is 
measured as the mean of 11 questions on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, or 
CES-D 11: first, ‘I lost my appetite’, second, ‘I was relatively OK’, third, ‘I was very depressed’, 
fourth, ‘Everything seemed to be overwhelming’, ‘fifth, ‘I could not sleep well’, sixth, ‘I was lonely 
and felt I was the only one in the world’, seventh, ‘I did not have any complaints’, eighth, ‘Everyone 
seemed to be mean to me’, ninth ‘I was sad’, tenth, ‘Everyone seemed to hate me’, and eleventh, ‘I 
did not have the courage to do anything’, on a 0-3 scale (Reis, 1989; Kohout, Berkman, Evans & 
Cornoni-Huntley, 1993). Among the 11 questions, answers of the second and the seventh questions 
are coded reversely. Thus, the higher the score, the more depressed. Since both life satisfaction and 
depression is measured within limited variation, the direction and significant level of coefficients are 
worth noting. 
Figure 2 displays changes in objective and subjective well-being. Trends of mean household 
disposable income and life satisfaction of the full analysis sample, 2007-2016, are shown in A1 and 
B1, respectively. With a steady increase in objective well-being and household disposable income in 
A1, there is a drop in 2009 due to the financial crisis. The other drops after 2012 may not be free from 
the sample addition to the KoWePS, in that leavers from panels are likely to be more vulnerable than 
those who keep following the panel, resulting in a new average with new-comers being lower. Life 
satisfaction, a proxy for subjective well-being in B1, shows clearer fluctuations over years with drops 
in 2009, the same financial crisis, and in 2014, the sinking of MV Sewol.  
Considering those socioeconomic circumstances and recalling that the coverage has been expanded 
in January of 2008, this study utilizes the year of 2007 as the before the period of coverage expansion 
and 2008-2009 as the after a period of benefit increase to use average changes between the two years. 
Benefit doubled in the July of 2014 excludes the year of 2014 due to facts that it is not possible to 
disentangle individual experiences before and after the policy changes from KoWePS which collects 
whole year information and the national tragedy the sinking of MV Sewol, resulting in a substantial 
drop of subjective well-being. 
Along with the policy changes of coverage expansion and benefit increase, there are four types of 
groups that influence the results. The first type is the non-beneficiaries. The second type is new 
beneficiaries, who do not benefit from TCT before a policy change and start to benefit after the policy 
change. The third type is ongoing beneficiaries, who keep benefitting from TCT before and after a 
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policy change. The last type is past beneficiaries, who received benefit from TCT before a policy 
change and are excluded from TCT after the policy change. 
Considering the types of policy changes, two definitions of treatment groups for coverage 
expansion and benefit increase are utilized. For coverage expansion in 2008, in order to extract the 
effects of coverage expansion in keeping benefiting and not benefiting from the policy, the target 
treatment group comprises of new beneficiaries of the changed policy, leaving non-beneficiaries, 
continued beneficiaries, and out-of-beneficiaries with under 80% of the CI in the control group. For 
the benefit increase in 2014, in order to extract the effects of the benefit increase from of other status 
changes of the policy, the target treatment groups are beneficiaries who keep benefiting from the 
policy before and after the policy change, with non-beneficiaries, new beneficiaries, and out-of-
beneficiaries with under 80% of the CI as the control group. Since heterogeneity in the control group 
may cause endogeneity in group composition, it will be addressed in a robustness check. 
A2, A3, B2, and B3 of figure 2 represent trends of objective and subjective well-being of the 
treatment group and the control group as before and after each policy change. A2 and A3 show a 
steeper increase in household disposable income of the treatment group than that of the control group. 
However, B2 and B3 show a steeper increase in life satisfaction of the control group than that of the 
treatment group. 
Detailed summary statistics in the previous year of policy changes are given in table 4. With 
outcome variables of interest control variables containing a dummy for female, age, a dummy for 
chronic disease as objective health status, dummies for the education of primary school, of middle 
school, and of high school and above (using a dummy for no education as a reference group), 
household size, employment status, and adjusted household disposable income. The relationship 
between age and subjective WB are U-shaped in a number of relative studies, implying overall life 
satisfaction decreases as people age until their 40s, and then increases as they age further 
(Branchflower & Oswald, 2008, Weiss et al., 2012). Employment status is categorized as a worker, 
the unemployed who seek to paid-work, and those out-of-labor forces. Adjusted disposable household 
income, redefined as disposable household income subtracted by benefit received from TCT, is used 
to control for economic status which is not correlated with TCT status if necessary. Summary statistics 
of each group after the policy changes are shown in table A1 in the appendix. 
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Figure 2 Objective and subjective well-being trends, 2007-2016 
A1. Mean household disposable income, full sample  B1. Mean life satisfaction, full sample  
   
 
A2. Mean household disposable income before and after 
Coverage Expansion, restricted sample (BOAP, 2008) 
B2. Mean life satisfaction before and after Coverage 
Expansion, restricted sample (BOAP, 2008) 
  
 
A3. Mean household disposable income before and after 
Benefit Increase, restricted sample (BP, 2014) 
B3. Mean life satisfaction before and after Benefit Increase, 
restricted sample (BP, 2014) 
  
Note: Figure A1 and B1 represent objective and subjective well-being of the full sample. Figure A2, A3, B2 and B3 represent 
objective and subjective well-being of the main analysis sample of those aged 66 and over, excluding the top 20% of CI. 
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Table 4 Pre-policy changes summary statistics regarding groups of treatment and control in 2007, 2013 
Group Stat. Objective  
Well-Being 
 Subjective Well-Being Dummy 
for 
Female 
Age Dummy 
for 
Chronic 
Disease 
Dummy 
for 
having 
partner 
Education level Hhld 
size 
Employment status Adjusted  
disposable 
hhld  
income 
(DI-
Benefit 
from TCT) 
Disposable  
hhld 
income 
(DI) 
Private  
Transfer 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Depression Primary 
school or 
below 
Middle 
school 
High 
school 
or 
above 
Workers Unemployed Out-of-
labor 
force 
Panel A. Coverage Expansion, 2007                
Treated Obs. 961 961  1109 1083 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 1109 961 
 Mean 109.3  2.4   3.0  1.8  0.67  74.2  0.82  0.53  0.39  0.11  0.11  2.04  0.20  0.01  0.79  55.6  
 S.D. 103.8  3.5   0.8  0.6  0.47  6.1  0.39  0.50  0.49  0.31  0.31  1.11  0.40  0.11  0.41  133.4  
 Min. -9.2  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -145.9  
 Max. 1053.7  35.9   5 3.8  1 96 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1028.0  
                   
Treated*NP Obs. 999 999  1029 1013 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 999 
 Mean 99.5  3.1   3.1  1.8  0.69  73.4  0.82  0.50  0.40  0.08  0.08  2.06  0.32  0.02  0.66  -16.2  
 S.D. 92.4  2.9   0.8  0.5  0.46  5.4  0.39  0.50  0.49  0.28  0.27  1.13  0.47  0.13  0.47  98.3  
 Min. -47.9  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -540.5  
 Max. 845.3  21.9   5 3.5  1 99 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 723.7  
                   
NP only Obs. 169 169  172 169 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 169 
 Mean 112.6  2.5   3.1  1.6  0.40  69.4  0.78  0.65  0.47  0.14  0.12  2.19  0.57  0.06  0.37  11.6  
 S.D. 86.2  2.5   0.7  0.5  0.49  3.3  0.42  0.48  0.50  0.35  0.32  1.17  0.50  0.23  0.48  95.5  
 Min. 13.6  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -135.033 
 Max. 613.8  12.8   4 3.2  1 86 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 497.8  
                   
Non-Treated 
*non-NP 
Obs. 
215 215  227 226 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 215  
 Mean 149.1  2.2   3.3  1.6  0.31  70.0  0.79  0.72  0.33  0.14  0.34  2.11  0.36  0.01  0.63  130.2  
 S.D. 101.2  3.5   0.7  0.6  0.46  3.5  0.41  0.45  0.47  0.34  0.47  0.93  0.48  0.11  0.48  117.2  
 Min. -13.8  0.0   2 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -164.517 
 Max. 570.7  28.5   5 3.5  1 84 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 556.8  
                   
Total Obs. 2344 2344  2537 2491 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2537 2344  
 Mean 109.0  2.7   3.1  1.8  0.62  73.2  0.81  0.54  0.40  0.10  0.12  2.06  0.29  0.02  0.70  28.7  
 S.D. 98.5  3.2   0.8  0.6  0.48  5.7  0.39  0.50  0.49  0.30  0.32  1.11  0.45  0.13  0.46  124.2  
 Min. -47.9  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -540.5 
 Max. 1053.7  35.9   5 3.8  1 99 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1028.0  
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Table 4 Pre-policy changes summary statistics regarding groups of treatment and control in 2007, 2013 (Cont’d) 
Group Stat. Objective  
Well-Being 
 Subjective Well-Being Dummy 
for 
Female 
Age Dummy 
for 
Chronic 
Disease 
Dummy 
for 
having 
partner 
Education level Hhld 
size 
Employment status Adjusted  
disposable 
hhld  
income 
(DI-
Benefit 
from TCT) 
Disposable  
hhld 
income 
(DI) 
Private  
Transfer 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Depression Primary 
school or 
below 
Middle 
school 
High 
school 
or 
above 
Workers Unemployed Out-of-
labor 
force 
Panel B. Benefit Increase, 2013                
Treated Obs. 605 605  828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 828 605 
 Mean 175.3  3.6   3.4  1.6  0.68  76.1  0.88  0.63  0.43  0.14  0.15  2.06  0.25  0.00  0.75  145.4  
 S.D. 124.3  4.5   0.7  0.5  0.47  6.3  0.32  0.48  0.50  0.34  0.35  0.99  0.43  0.03  0.43  150.5  
 Min. -3.3  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -245.0  
 Max. 912.1  42.9   5 4.0  1 94 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 900.4  
                   
Treated*NP Obs. 2154 2154  2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 2154 
 Mean 119.6  3.0   3.3  1.6  0.74  75.2  0.89  0.50  0.44  0.12  0.10  1.88  0.31  0.00  0.69  -107.4  
 S.D. 118.4  3.9   0.7  0.5  0.44  5.5  0.32  0.50  0.50  0.33  0.29  1.01  0.46  0.05  0.46  125.2  
 Min. -1456.0  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1795.4  
 Max. 1770.9  59.8   5 3.9  1 105 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1569.2  
                   
NP only Obs. 677 677  677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 
 Mean 142.9  2.9   3.5  1.4  0.45  71.8  0.86  0.58  0.48  0.15  0.16  1.91  0.46  0.01  0.53  -84.9  
 S.D. 115.7  3.2   0.6  0.5  0.50  3.8  0.35  0.49  0.50  0.35  0.37  0.92  0.50  0.08  0.50  126.2  
 Min. 13.2  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -286.367 
 Max. 1498.6  38.4   5 3.4  1 87 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1300.3  
                   
Non-Treated 
*non-NP 
Obs. 
384 384  443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 384  
 Mean 215.3  2.9   3.6  1.4  0.30  71.9  0.84  0.72  0.31  0.20  0.38  2.06  0.40  0.00  0.59  193.6  
 S.D. 132.7  3.4   0.6  0.5  0.46  4.3  0.36  0.45  0.46  0.40  0.49  0.94  0.49  0.05  0.49  150.9  
 Min. 11.4  0.0   2 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -217.75 
 Max. 824.3  18.6   5 3.5  1 92 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 813.8  
                   
Total Obs. 3820 3820  4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 4102 3820  
 Mean 142.2  3.1   3.4  1.5  0.63  74.5  0.88  0.56  0.43  0.14  0.15  1.94  0.33  0.00  0.66  -33.1  
 S.D. 124.4  3.8   0.7  0.5  0.48  5.6  0.33  0.50  0.50  0.34  0.36  0.99  0.47  0.05  0.47  177.0  
 Min. -1456.0  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1795.35 
 Max. 1770.9  59.8   5 4.0  1 105 1 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 1569.2  
Note: Main analysis sample is restricted to those aged 66 and over, excluding top 20% of the CI. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and 
ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment
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4. Model  
To analyze the effects of policy changes of coverage expansion and benefit increase, I utilize the 
DID, which requires several conditions to be met: First, there must be an exogenous policy change 
only in treatment groups. Second, there must be control groups in which the same policy is not 
changed. Third, both the treatment group and the control group share common trends before the 
exogenous policy change. Last, there must be a dataset containing information on policy changes, 
outcomes, and controls. Because of the nature of the TCT considering the economic status of 
applicants which is endogenous to outcomes, those conditions cannot be easily met without 
management with assumptions. The basic model of DID is below: 
 
(1)  𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
 
, where 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a set of outcomes of interest of objective and subjective well-being of individual 𝑖 
in region r in year t. For objective well-being, the amount of disposable household income and private 
transfer is used and, for subjective well-being, life satisfaction as a positive indicator and depression 
as a negative indicator are used. Since the log values of the amount of disposable household income 
and private transfer are used, each is replaced with 1 if values are less than 1. So, 100 units of each 
coefficient are interpreted to guide a 1% change in outcomes. 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 is a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if the year is after the policy changes in 2008-2009 
and in 2015. 𝑇𝑖𝑟 is a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if the individual is in the treatment group of 
changed policies of BOAP in 2008 and of BP in 2014. Thus, in this model, 𝛽3 is the coefficient of 
interest, implying the effects of policy changes. 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a vector of individual control variables, 
including gender, age, chronic disease, education level, household size, employment status, and 
adjusted disposable household income. 𝜏𝑟 is a vector of regional fixed effects.
2
 
Considering TCT is additional cash transfer for the relatively poor elderly using government 
revenue not conditional on individual contribution to the policy, I also utilize Difference-in-
Differences-in-Differences (DDD). DDD hypothesizes that NP based on contributions through 
employment may provide beneficiaries with legitimacy to the additional public transfer. This allows 
                                           
2 The KoWePS only provides 2 proxies of region because of the Personal Information Protection Law: 7 districts and 5 areas 
of metropolitan, city, rural area and combination. By combining two variables, it is possible to separate regions into 21 
categories, reflecting both district and size of area: the metropolitan area in Seoul (reference), metropolitan areas of Busan 
and Ulsan, rural areas of Busan and Ulsan, metropolitan areas of Daegu, rural areas of Daegu, metropolitan areas of Incheon, 
rural areas of Incheon, metropolitan areas of Daejeon, rural areas of Daejeon, metropolitan areas of Gwangju, rural areas of 
Gwangju, city areas in Gyunggi, rural areas in Gyunggi, city areas in Gangwon and Chung-buk, rural areas in Gangwon and 
Chung-buk, city areas in Chung-nam, rural areas in Chung-nam, city areas in Gyung-buk, rural areas in Gyung-buk, city 
areas in Gyung-nam, rural areas in Gyung-nam, city areas in Jeonra-do and Jeju, rural areas in Jeonra-do and Jeju. 
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controlling for the policy effects of those who benefit from both TCT and NP based on contribution 
through employment, extracting the pure effects on the well-being of those benefits from TCT only. 
The model of DDD is below:  
 
(2)  𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖𝑟 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 
+𝛽4𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 
+𝛽7𝑇𝑖𝑟 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
 
, where 𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if the individual benefits from NP. Thus, 𝛽7 
is the effect of policy change for those who benefit from both changed BOAP/BP and National 
Pension based on their own contributions. 𝛽3 represents the effect of policy change for those whose 
benefit only changed with BOAP/BP, holding the effect of beneficiaries of NP constant, who are 
considered as beneficiaries of the policy changes without direct contribution.  
One concern for using DID and DDD is individual unobservable characteristics. Since the KoWePS 
is a nationwide panel study in South Korea, it is possible to adopt an individual fixed-effects model 
(FE). Lechner et al. (2016) pointed out that OLS and FE have both pros and cons when using an 
unbalanced panel in a DID setting. OLS is consistent and more efficient than FE, in that it uses more 
observations. Attrition, however, may cause substantial bias in the estimation, so that an unbalanced 
panel with less than 80% of balanced observations across years may show a difference in significance 
in estimations.  
This study focuses on two exogenous policy changes, coverage expansion and benefit increase, in 
TCT with an economic cutoff result in heterogeneity in beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
objective and subjective well-being. Definition of the treated for each policy change is also different, 
causing heterogeneities in two different treatment groups and two different control groups. In spite of 
changes in population after policy changes, two types of heterogeneity cause difficulty in 
understanding the results of FE. Thus, OLS is used in the main results and results from the FE model 
are presented in table A2 of appendix. 
The other concern is that the measurement of life satisfaction is an ordinal variable with a 1-5 scale 
in the KoWePS. In this study, however, as in common literature, ordinary least squares (OLS) with 
yearly and regional fixed effects are used, and ignoring the ordinality of the data results in little 
changes in the final results when allowing for fixed effects (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004). 
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5. Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the OLS of the control variables, using the sample of 2007-2009 for the 
coverage expansion effects of BOAP in columns (1) – (4) and the sample of 2013 and 2015 for the 
benefit increase effects of BP in columns (5) – (8). As expected from the literature, females have 
lower disposable household income in columns (1) and (4), implying lower economic status, and 
higher private transfers in columns (2) and (6), implying more support from adult children, higher life 
satisfaction in columns (3) and (7) and higher depression in columns (4) and (8), implying more 
emotional responses than males.  
Age shows a U-shaped relation with economic status and an inverse U-shaped relation with 
economic support. Age does not have a significant U-shaped relation with life satisfaction and 
depression after 66. Having a chronic disease increases economic support and depression and 
decreases life satisfaction. Having a partner and higher education level are connected to higher 
household income, private transfers, life satisfaction and lower depression. A larger household size 
leads to higher economic status, lower private transfers from adult children who are not living 
together and lower depression. Compared to workers, the unemployed and those out of the labor force 
have lower disposable household income, higher private transfers, lower life satisfaction, and higher 
depression, and more adjusted household disposable income is related to more private transfers and 
higher life satisfaction, and lower depression. 
The results of analyses of basic models using the restricted sample, which excludes the top 20% of 
the simulated CI, are represented in table 6. In both panel A and B, dummies of after policy changes 
show a higher quality of WB which are consistent with the overall improvement in A2, A3, B2, and 
B3 of figure 2. Dummies of the treated show a lower quality of WB than those controlled. Those who 
receive National Pension (NP) based on contribution during employment show better objective and 
subjective WB in columns (5)-(8) with positive coefficients of disposable household income and life 
satisfaction, and a negative coefficient of depression at the 0.1% significance level. Coefficients of 
those who receive both NP and TCT are negative for objective WB and life satisfaction, implying a 
relatively inferior level of WB. 
Focusing on policy effects controlled for trends between the treated and the controlled of coverage 
expansion in 2008 in panel A in columns (1) – (4), the coefficients of interactions between the dummy 
of the treatment group and the dummy of after the policy change imply relative variations in the 
treated compared to the overall improvement of the controlled caused by exogenous policy changes in 
the first row of each column. Coverage expansion to the treated shows a higher increase in log 
disposable household income (0.037 S.D.) and a larger decrease in log private transfers (-0.068 S.D.) 
as objective WB at the 5% significance level. For subjective WB, however, coverage expansion to the 
treated decreases life satisfaction (-0.086 S.D.) compared to the controlled at the 0.1% significance 
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level, with an increase in depression (0.045 S.D.) at the 5% significance level. 
In the same column, panel B shows exogenous benefit increase effects on objective and subjective 
WB of ongoing beneficiaries as the treated in the first row. In columns (1) and (2) as objective WB, 
the signs of coefficients of interaction are consistent with those in panel A but not different from zero. 
In column (3) and (4), it is shown that exogenous benefit increase has a relatively negative impact on 
life satisfaction (-0.072 S.D.) at the 1% significance level and a positive impact on depression (0.047 
S.D.) at the 5% significance level.  
In spite of the positive impact on disposable household income, not only the negative impacts on 
both private transfer and life satisfaction but also the positive impact on the depression of the treated 
seem to be different with the policy intentions of higher levels of WB of the treated, which poses 
questions. With the idea that Social Pension (SP), including both the coverage expansion in 2008 and 
the benefit increase in 2014, is initially designed to relax the severe problem of the highest level of 
poverty level of seniors in South Korea, TCT for seniors as a means-tested provision is not enough to 
solve the issue due to budget constraints and political debates. Without financial contribution to the SP, 
coverage with a cutoff and not enough benefit as compensation for personal information about the 
applicant and his adult children may divide beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.  
In this line, results in columns (5) – (8) consider both TCT and NP based on individuals’ own 
contribution through employment. Coefficients in the first row of panels A and B are of interest 
regarding the treated of coverage expansion and of benefit increase, holding other factors constant 
including the benefit status of NP based on contributions through employment during the individual’s 
economic involvement. Effects on the treated of both TCT change and NP are in the second row, and 
those of beneficiaries of only NP are in the fifth row. Beneficiaries of only NP show a higher quality 
of WB, higher disposable household income (0.121 S.D., 0.086 S.D.) and life satisfaction (0.100 S.D., 
0.086 S.D.) as can be seen in the fifth row in both panel A and B. Effects of both coverage expansion 
and NP in panel A are negative on life satisfaction (0.053 S.D.) at the 1% significance level. In panel 
B, however, those benefitting from both policies show near-zero impacts on WB.  
When holding those effects of NP constant, the coefficients of the treated of coverage expansion 
show significant effects on both objective and subjective WB. Coverage expansion, in panel A, 
increases disposable household income by 6.5% a month (0.041 S.D.) at the 5% significance level in 
spite of a decrease of 18.5% in private transfers a month (-0.079 S.D.). Even though benefit increase 
decreases private transfers a month at a marginal level, it does not have an impact on final disposable 
household income, compensating for the decrease in private transfers. For subjective WB, both 
coverage expansion and benefit increase result in a decrease in life satisfaction by 15.0% (-0.099 S.D.) 
and 9.5% (-0.071 S.D.) at the 0.1% and 1% significance level, respectively. Only benefiting from both 
benefit increase and NP increases depression by 5.1% (0.050 S.D.) at the 5% significance level, 
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leaving need of robustness checks and causing questions about the inconsistent impact patterns 
compared to expectations, for which additional public transfers will provide better experienced utility. 
 
Table 5 Well-being effects of controls, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BOAP, 2007-2009  BP, 2013, 2015 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Female 0.032 0.206*** 0.082*** 0.074*** -0.018 0.220*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014) (0.030) (0.018) (0.013) 
Age -0.149*** 0.139+ 0.030 0.010 -0.127*** 0.295*** 0.029 0.037+ 
 
(0.039) (0.071) (0.040) (0.030) (0.028) (0.057) (0.029) (0.020) 
Age squared 
/100 
0.090*** -0.084+ -0.020 -0.006 0.074*** -0.182*** -0.017 -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.047) (0.027) (0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.019) (0.013) 
Chronic 
disease 
-0.010 0.089* -0.122*** 0.155*** -0.001 0.070 -0.113*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.024) (0.044) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.044) (0.023) (0.015) 
Having 
partner 
0.061* 0.438*** 0.081** -0.111*** 0.050* 0.454*** 0.089*** -0.089*** 
 (0.027) (0.054) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.047) (0.023) (0.016) 
Education level (Ref. no education) 
of primary 
school 
0.127*** 0.219*** 0.103*** -0.055** 0.099*** 0.119** 0.082*** -0.037* 
 (0.022) (0.049) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.041) (0.021) (0.016) 
of middle 
school 
0.189*** 0.239** 0.206*** -0.122*** 0.194*** 0.113+ 0.138*** -0.052* 
 
(0.037) (0.074) (0.038) (0.031) (0.027) (0.061) (0.029) (0.022) 
of high 
school and 
above 
0.306*** 0.354*** 0.268*** -0.186*** 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.191*** -0.094*** 
 
(0.044) (0.083) (0.043) (0.032) (0.031) (0.064) (0.032) (0.023) 
Household 
size 
0.370*** -0.147*** -0.059*** 0.002 0.391*** -0.206*** -0.046*** -0.021** 
 (0.011) (0.031) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.027) (0.011) (0.007) 
Employment Status (Ref. Worker) 
The 
unemployed 
-0.208* 0.308* -0.239** 0.077 -0.158 -0.260 -0.413* 0.221* 
 (0.087) (0.126) (0.083) (0.064) (0.100) (0.273) (0.165) (0.112) 
Out of labor 
forces 
-0.070*** 0.247*** -0.078** 0.061** -0.095*** 0.155*** -0.143*** 0.121*** 
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017) (0.037) (0.019) (0.014) 
Log of 
adjusted 
hhld 
disposable 
income  
 0.012 0.044*** -0.023***  -0.007 0.035*** -0.010*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 9.679*** -5.452* 1.859 1.403 9.337*** -11.224*** 2.215* -0.157 
 
(1.469) (2.686) (1.515) (1.124) (1.064) (2.206) (1.095) (0.765) 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982 7479 6588 7479 7479 
adj. R-sq 0.404 0.060 0.059 0.106 0.444 0.060 0.053 0.102 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. BOAP is abbreviation for Basic Old Age Pension implemented in 
January of 2008 with coverage expansion and BP is the abbreviation for Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. 
+p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 6 Well-being effects of TCT, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.058* -0.161* -0.130*** 0.051*  0.065* -0.186** -0.150*** 0.046+ 
 
(0.029) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.064) (0.037) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.016 0.172+ 0.163** -0.001 
 
     (0.042) (0.093) (0.059) (0.044) 
After 0.170*** 0.202*** 0.131*** -0.144***  0.163*** 0.203*** 0.122*** -0.138*** 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018)  (0.021) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018) 
Treated -0.125*** 0.585*** 0.105** -0.092***  -0.095** 0.621*** 0.131*** -0.106*** 
 (0.030) (0.066) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.032) (0.068) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      0.235*** 0.018 0.188*** -0.137*** 
 
     (0.032) (0.069) (0.037) (0.028) 
Treated*NP      -0.141** -0.247* -0.172** 0.098+ 
 
     (0.051) (0.110) (0.064) (0.051) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.407 0.095 0.060 0.108  0.414 0.096 0.066 0.112 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log 
private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.019 -0.090 -0.096** 0.047*  0.029 -0.116+ -0.095** 0.051* 
 
(0.025) (0.060) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.026) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.021 0.056 0.016 -0.019 
 
     (0.021) (0.053) (0.035) (0.025) 
After 0.144*** 0.011 0.093*** -0.061**  0.133*** 0.021 0.082** -0.057** 
 (0.022) (0.053) (0.028) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.053) (0.028) (0.019) 
Treated -0.322*** 0.072 -0.076* 0.010  -0.308*** 0.027 -0.070+ 0.011 
 (0.024) (0.073) (0.033) (0.025)  (0.028) (0.078) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      0.129*** -0.100 0.122*** -0.042+ 
 
     (0.031) (0.061) (0.030) (0.024) 
Treated*NP      0.011 0.137+ 0.013 -0.018 
 
     (0.035) (0.074) (0.038) (0.029) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.480 0.060 0.057 0.103  0.485 0.061 0.064 0.105 
Note: Clustered standard errors within household are in parentheses. Treated is abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension 
implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with 
benefit increase. NP is abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. Dummy for 
female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted household 
disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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6. Robustness checks 
 
6.1. Robustness check: Propensity-score matching 
DID assumes common trends between the treatment group and control group, and a restricted 
sample using calculated CI to solve the imbalance due to the conditionality of the TCT (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002; Jalan and Ravlllion, 2003; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Li, 2012). As TCT with an 
economic cutoff differentiates beneficiaries from non-beneficiaries, a method towards a balance 
across groups is needed. In order to provide it, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is applied. Before 
PSM, the result of logit regression of the treated of BOAP and of BP using pre-determinants, i.e., age, 
gender, household size, the region where the individual is living and the entitlement to NP, of the TCT 
in 2007 and in 2013 is in table 7.  
Before coverage expansion in 2007, the probability of the treated living in rural regions relative to 
city regions is higher than that of the controlled at the 0.1% significance level, while the probabilities 
of being older, living in a metro region relative to the city, and having entitlement to NP of the treated 
are lower than that of the controlled at a significant level. In the cases of before the benefit increase in 
2013, the probabilities of being female and living in a rural region relative to city regions of the 
treated are higher than that of the controlled at a significant level. The probabilities of being older, 
having more members of family, living in the metro region relative to city regions and having an 
entitlement to NP are lower than that of the controlled in the significant level. 
 
Table 7 Logit regression results using restricted sample in the base year 
  Before coverage expansion, 2007 Before benefit increase, 2013 
  Coef.  Std.Err.    Coef.  Std.Err.   
Age -0.031  (0.008) *** -0.028  (0.007) *** 
Dummy for female 0.120  (0.087)  0.331  (0.074) *** 
Household size 0.052  (0.037)  -0.143  (0.034) *** 
Dummy for Metro regions (ref. city regions) -0.348  (0.104) ** -0.149  (0.082)  
Dummy for rural regions 0.377  (0.103) *** 0.263  (0.088) ** 
Entitlement to National Pension -0.335  (0.120) ** -0.543  (0.083) *** 
Constant 2.054  (0.580) *** 3.132  (0.524) *** 
Observation 2537   4102   
Pseudo R2 0.022   0.027   
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if the individual is the treated. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
  Table 8 presents the balance level between the treated and the controlled after PSM using the kernel 
method, which is nonparametric matching estimators which use weighted averages of nearly all 
observations in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. To ensure balance between 
the two groups of mean differences and t-test, standardized bias is implemented, which is the 
percentage differences of the sample mean in the treated and the controlled as a percentage of the 
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square root of the average of the sample variances in the two groups (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985, 
pp.33-34), using the equation below:  
 
SB = 100 ×
?̅?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑐
√0.5(𝑠𝑡
2 + 𝑠𝑐2)
 
 
, where for each covariate ?̅?𝑡 and ?̅?𝑐 are the sample means in the treated and the controlled and 𝑠𝑡
2 
and 𝑠𝑐
2 are the corresponding sample variances. Using the statistics mentioned, after PSM, 
demographic characteristics of matched samples of treatment and control groups are relatively 
balanced between the two. 
 
Table 8 Mean differences of matched-restricted sample in the base year 
 
Before coverage expansion, 2007 
 
Before benefit increase, 2013 
Mean 
SB t value. 
 
Mean 
SB t value. Treatment  
group 
Control 
group  
Treatment  
group 
Control 
group 
Age 72.858  72.958  -0.7 -0.45  74.369  74.438  -0.5 -0.46 
Dummy for female 0.645  0.643  0.4 0.10  0.669  0.664  1.1 0.44 
Household size 2.075  2.054  1.7 0.47  1.887  1.927  -3.3 -1.65 
Dummy for Metro regions 0.304  0.313  -1.9 -0.48  0.338  0.344  -1.2 -0.47 
Dummy for rural regions 0.435  0.423  2.8 0.61  0.333  0.314  4.8 1.60 
Entitlement to National 
Pension 
0.143  0.137  1.4 0.45  0.239  0.238  0.2 0.09 
Note. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
The results of DID and DDD using the matched sample by PSM in the restricted sample is 
presented in table 9. As in table 6, columns (1) - (4) show the results of DID considering only 
coverage expansion or benefit increase and columns (5) - (8) show the results of DDD considering 
both policy changes and NP. Panel A presents results of the 2008 coverage expansion and panel B 
shows results of the benefit increase in 2014. In columns (1) and (2), both coverage expansion and 
benefit increase show near-zero effects on disposable household income, while coverage expansion 
crowds out the private transfers. In columns (3) and (4), both coverage expansion and benefit increase 
show negative effects on subjective WB of the treated, i.e., negative effects on life satisfaction at the 
0.1% and 1% significance level and positive effects on depression at the 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively. 
When considering two policy changes and NP based on contribution in column (5) - (8), the 
coefficients of the treated seem to be larger than those in column (1) – (4). Holding benefitting from 
NP constant in the second and fifth row in the Panel A and B, coverage expansion has a negative 
effect on private transfer a month by 20.8% at the 1% significance level. The effects on the disposable 
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household income of the treated are positive but not different from zero, compensating the loss of 
private transfers by coverage expansion. For subjective WB, both coverage expansion and benefit 
increase have negative effects on life satisfaction of the treated by 15.9% at the 0.1% significance 
level and 10.5% at the 1% significance level. Coverage expansion and benefit increase has a 7.2% and 
5.7% positive effect on the depression of the treated at the significance level. These are consistent 
results with the basic model in table 6. 
 
6.2. Robustness check: Heterogeneity in control groups 
As we reviewed in figure 2, those in the treatment groups for coverage expansion and benefit 
increase comprise new beneficiaries and ongoing beneficiaries of TCT, respectively. The first control 
group for coverage expansion includes non-beneficiaries, ongoing beneficiaries, and past beneficiaries. 
The second control group for benefit increase has non-beneficiaries, new beneficiaries, and past 
beneficiaries. There is a need for control for heterogeneity in control groups in that it may cause 
endogeneity in results. Controlling for heterogeneity in control groups is shown in table 11, with 
policy changes to the treated in the first row of panel A and panel B, displaying effects consistent with 
the main results in table 6.  
 
6.3. Robustness check: Expanding to those aged 60 and over 
As an additional robustness check, possible trends of objective and subjective WB across ages are 
considered in table 11. Expanding the age range to 60, those aged 65 are excluded to control an age 
effect entering the cutoff of being an official senior at 65. As in previous tables, columns (1) – (4) 
present DID results, columns (5) – (8) show DDD results. New columns (9) – (12) contain results of 
DDD using a dummy for those aged 60-64 as an additional consideration. The interaction between the 
treated and those aged 60-64 captures those who have TCT beneficiaries as their family members. 
Since they benefit from TCT indirectly, results in columns (9) – (12) are expected to control for prior 
trends before benefiting from TCT directly. Expanding the age range to 60 and controlling for prior 
trends before 65 shows consistent results with those in table 6. 
 
6.4. Robustness check: Controls for macro shock in longer period 
Since there was a financial crisis in 2008-2009 and a national tragedy of the Sewol ferry disaster in 
2014, table 12 presents results controlled for macro shocks measured by GDP growth rate. Controlling 
for yearly fixed effects, the new sample in KoWePS in 2012 is a discouragement to extending the 
analysis period across 2012, restricting the first period to 2007-2011 for coverage expansion and the 
second period to 2012-2017 for benefit increase. The year of 2014 is excluded from the second period 
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because the exogenous policy change occurred in July of that year and the KoWePS collects 
information from the whole year.  
The coverage expansion in panel A has overall crowding out effects on private transfers across years 
after policy changes. It has positive effects on disposable household income, especially in 2009, after 
the first year of the financial crisis in 2008 with and without controls for NP in columns (1) and (5). It 
decreases life satisfaction when controlling for NP in column (7). Benefit increase in panel B also has 
crowding out effects of a reduction in private transfers after the policy change in 2014 at the 0.1% 
significance level. It is found that disposable household income of the treated is lower than that of the 
controlled before the policy change in 2013. The coefficient of 2014 becomes smaller than that of 
2013 and that of 2015 is near-zero. This implies that benefit increase in 2014 gradually removes the 
substantial difference of household income between the treated and the controlled. 
 
6.5. Robustness check: Relative economic status 
Table 13 delivers results controlling for CI deciles to see the role of relative economic status. In 
panel A, an increase in disposable household income and crowding out private transfers due to 
coverage expansion occurs in groups with higher deciles of CI. A decrease in life satisfaction and 
increase in depression, however, happens to those with lower deciles of CI.  
Benefit increase in panel B has positive effects on disposable household income across all deciles 
of CI in column (1). However, when controlling for NP in column (5), the effects become near-zero 
for those with 1-4 deciles of CI. The positive effects of benefit increase remain to those with higher 
deciles of CI in significance level. Coefficients of benefit increase across CI deciles on private transfer 
have negative signs with/without controls for NP at the 0.1% significance level. Effects on subjective 
WB, decreases in life satisfaction and increases in depression occur to those with the lowest decile of 
CI, the most vulnerable. In line with benefit increase effects on disposable household income, what is 
noticeable is that positive effects on life satisfaction of those with 5th and higher decile of CI in 
columns (1) – (4) becomes near-zero when controlling for NP in column (5) – (8). 
 
6.6. Robustness check: Different cutoffs of CI 
Table 14 presents results with different cutoffs of CI. Coverage expansion effects are shown of the 
restricted sample with 70% of CI in panel A1, with 90% of CI in panel A2, and with 100% of CI in 
panel A3. Across cutoffs, coverage expansion has crowding out effects on private transfers and 
decrease life satisfaction. Coverage expansion increases disposable household income in panel A2 and 
A3. Benefit increase effects are presented regarding the restricted sample with 70% of the CI in panel 
B1, with 90% of the CI in panel B2, and with 100% of the CI in panel B3. Benefit increase decreases 
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life satisfaction and increases depression across cutoffs. In panel B2 and B3, benefit increase crowds 
out private transfers. 
 
6.7. Robustness check: Different controls 
As an additional robustness check, the effects of a different set of control variables on objective and 
subjective well-being are shown in table A2 in the appendix. The issue of housing is regarded to 
matter to the quality of life of the elderly in South Korea. Therefore, the alternative set of control 
variables includes a dummy for household head and housing ownership status, i.e., having ownership, 
living with a deposit, living paying monthly rent, leaving the case of living in a house for free. The 
last case of no burden for housing includes those who live in their adult children’s house or company 
house. As in table A2, being the head of a household decreases the amount of private transfers in both 
periods of 2007-2009 of BOAP and 2013, 2015 of BP at the 5% significance level. It, however, only 
increases depression of those in the sample of BP in 2013, 2015 at the 5% significance level. Table 15 
presents effects of exogenous changes in TCT consistent with main results in table 6, controlling for 
the new set of control variables.  
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Table 9 Well-being effects of TCT using matched-restricted sample by PSM, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PSM+DD 
 
PSM+DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.034 -0.176** -0.133*** 0.074**  0.037 -0.208** -0.159*** 0.072** 
 
(0.029) (0.065) (0.038) (0.026)  (0.030) (0.067) (0.040) (0.027) 
Treated*After*NP      0.001 0.175+ 0.190** -0.008 
 
     (0.048) (0.102) (0.062) (0.048) 
After 0.190*** 0.216*** 0.132*** -0.161***  0.184*** 0.219*** 0.125*** -0.157*** 
 (0.020) (0.052) (0.027) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.052) (0.027) (0.020) 
Treated -0.101*** 0.613*** 0.121*** -0.111***  -0.083** 0.662*** 0.139*** -0.118*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.035) (0.027)  (0.032) (0.071) (0.037) (0.028) 
NP      0.215*** 0.046 0.166*** -0.111*** 
 
     (0.034) (0.077) (0.042) (0.031) 
Treated*NP      -0.138* -0.284* -0.175* 0.081 
 
     (0.053) (0.121) (0.068) (0.056) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6529 5532 6529 6460  6526 5529 6526 6457 
Adj. R2 0.399 0.113 0.060 0.100  0.403 0.114 0.065 0.102 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PSM+DD  PSM+DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.022 -0.058 -0.104** 0.053*  0.046 -0.084 -0.105** 0.057* 
 
(0.028) (0.063) (0.036) (0.026)  (0.029) (0.066) (0.038) (0.028) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.040+ 0.050 0.029 -0.025 
 
     (0.024) (0.059) (0.038) (0.026) 
After 0.142*** -0.003 0.102** -0.069**  0.126*** 0.007 0.088** -0.064** 
 (0.025) (0.055) (0.031) (0.022)  (0.025) (0.056) (0.031) (0.022) 
Treated -0.291*** -0.010 -0.021 -0.033  -0.306*** -0.052 -0.033 -0.024 
 (0.026) (0.081) (0.039) (0.031)  (0.030) (0.085) (0.042) (0.034) 
NP      0.142*** -0.089 0.118*** -0.047+ 
 
     (0.037) (0.070) (0.034) (0.028) 
Treated*NP      0.026 0.148+ 0.005 -0.015 
       (0.040) (0.081) (0.042) (0.031) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7131 6285 7131 7131  7131 6285 7131 7131 
Adj. R2 0.393 0.065 0.071 0.099  0.400 0.066 0.077 0.101 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted 
household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 10 Well-being effects of TCT controlling for heterogeneity in control groups, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.072+ -0.037 -0.107** 0.038  0.079* -0.068 -0.125** 0.032 
 
(0.038) (0.074) (0.040) (0.028)  (0.040) (0.075) (0.042) (0.029) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.016 0.139 0.154** 0.004 
      (0.042) (0.094) (0.059) (0.044) 
After 0.156*** 0.080 0.109*** -0.132***  0.149*** 0.092 0.100** -0.125*** 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.031) (0.023)  (0.033) (0.064) (0.032) (0.023) 
Treated -0.283*** 0.206* -0.031 -0.014  -0.257*** 0.197* -0.001 -0.034 
 (0.039) (0.081) (0.043) (0.032)  (0.042) (0.084) (0.045) (0.034) 
NP      0.156*** -0.177* 0.152*** -0.116*** 
 
     (0.040) (0.077) (0.040) (0.031) 
Treated*NP      -0.055 -0.010 -0.123+ 0.070 
 
     (0.056) (0.116) (0.066) (0.053) 
Combinations of 
After*Control 
Group*NP 
N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.427 0.117 0.068 0.113  0.430 0.119 0.073 0.115 
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Table 10 Well-being effects of TCT controlling for heterogeneity in control groups, OLS (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.088** -0.156* -0.056 0.019  0.090** -0.175* -0.060 0.024 
 
(0.027) (0.070) (0.038) (0.026)  (0.027) (0.072) (0.039) (0.027) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.021 0.060 0.016 -0.019 
      (0.021) (0.053) (0.035) (0.025) 
After 0.075** 0.072 0.054 -0.033  0.072** 0.074 0.047 -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.065) (0.034) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.065) (0.034) (0.023) 
Treated -0.459*** 0.258** -0.163*** 0.058*  -0.478*** 0.211* -0.141** 0.056+ 
 (0.029) (0.092) (0.042) (0.029)  (0.036) (0.104) (0.047) (0.034) 
NP      0.040 -0.078 0.129*** -0.042 
 
     (0.036) (0.072) (0.034) (0.025) 
Treated*NP      0.098* 0.113 0.006 -0.018 
 
     (0.039) (0.083) (0.042) (0.031) 
Combinations of 
After*Control 
Group*NP 
N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.490 0.063 0.060 0.103  0.495 0.064 0.066 0.105 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Heterogeneity in control groups are controlled non-beneficiaries, ongoing beneficiaries, and past beneficiaries for coverage expansion and 
non-beneficiaries, new beneficiaries, and past beneficiaries for benefit increase. Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, 
marital status, education level household size, household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 
**p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table 11 Well-being effects of TCT expanding to those aged 60 and over, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
DD 
 
DDD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009      
Treated*After 0.038 -0.167** -0.112*** 0.024  0.041 -0.184** -0.131*** 0.026  0.058* -0.159* -0.133*** 0.051* 
 
(0.027) (0.056) (0.032) (0.021)  (0.028) (0.057) (0.033) (0.022)  (0.029) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.006 0.101 0.130* -0.032      
      (0.039) (0.079) (0.053) (0.038)      
After 0.186*** 0.210*** 0.119*** -0.120***  0.179*** 0.208*** 0.110*** -0.115***  0.169*** 0.204*** 0.133*** -0.143*** 
 (0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.015)  (0.019) (0.043) (0.021) (0.015)  (0.021) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018) 
Treated -0.130*** 0.574*** 0.105*** -0.071**  -0.089** 0.616*** 0.136*** -0.094***  -0.125*** 0.581*** 0.113*** -0.092*** 
 (0.027) (0.061) (0.030) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.063) (0.032) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.065) (0.034) (0.025) 
NP      0.253*** 0.100+ 0.204*** -0.144***      
 
     (0.026) (0.054) (0.029) (0.021)      
Treated*NP      -0.158*** -0.223* -0.163** 0.121**      
 
     (0.044) (0.092) (0.055) (0.042)      
Treated*After*Aged6064           -0.125+ -0.084 0.100 -0.110* 
           (0.070) (0.143) (0.083) (0.053) 
Aged6064           -0.045 -0.103 -0.026 -0.077+ 
           (0.051) (0.105) (0.055) (0.040) 
After*Aged6064           0.056 0.020 -0.048 0.074* 
           (0.041) (0.087) (0.047) (0.032) 
Treated*aged6064           -0.039 -0.053 -0.030 0.080 
           (0.062) (0.125) (0.069) (0.051) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8996 7470 8996 8902  8991 7466 8991 8897  8996 7470 8996 8902 
Adj. R2 0.416 0.100 0.060 0.109  0.426 0.100 0.069 0.115  0.417 0.100 0.060 0.109 
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Table 11 Well-being effects of TCT expanding to those aged 60 and over, OLS (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
DD 
 
DDD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015      
Treated*After 0.040+ -0.024 -0.063* 0.037+  0.044* -0.028 -0.068* 0.041*  0.022 -0.092 -0.102** 0.050* 
 
(0.021) (0.053) (0.029) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.055) (0.030) (0.021)  (0.025) (0.059) (0.033) (0.023) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.013 0.009 0.033 -0.021      
      (0.020) (0.051) (0.034) (0.023)      
After 0.120*** -0.049 0.056* -0.048**  0.112*** -0.049 0.047* -0.044**  0.140*** 0.013 0.097*** -0.062** 
 (0.017) (0.045) (0.023) (0.015)  (0.017) (0.045) (0.023) (0.015)  (0.022) (0.053) (0.028) (0.019) 
Treated -0.295*** 0.053 -0.049 -0.004  -0.273*** 0.037 -0.033 -0.006  -0.316*** 0.082 -0.034 -0.004 
 (0.022) (0.065) (0.031) (0.022)  (0.025) (0.069) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.068) (0.032) (0.023) 
NP      0.158*** -0.002 0.166*** -0.068***      
 
     (0.023) (0.049) (0.025) (0.018)      
Treated*NP      -0.008 0.054 -0.027 -0.005      
 
     (0.029) (0.063) (0.034) (0.024)      
Treated*After*Aged6064           0.058 0.312* 0.088 -0.026 
           (0.059) (0.145) (0.084) (0.054) 
Aged6064           -0.165*** 0.151 -0.026 0.058+ 
           (0.044) (0.095) (0.049) (0.032) 
After*Aged6064           -0.043 -0.197* -0.106* 0.035 
           (0.034) (0.091) (0.047) (0.030) 
Treated*aged6064           0.110* -0.106 -0.055 0.003 
           (0.047) (0.103) (0.058) (0.039) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8915 7687 8915 8915  8915 7687 8915 8915  8915 7687 8915 8915 
Adj. R2 0.502 0.073 0.060 0.109  0.510 0.073 0.070 0.113  0.504 0.073 0.060 0.109 
Note: To remove age condition effects of TCT, 65-year old individuals are excluded. Aged6064 indicates a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is 60-64 years old and 0 otherwise. This removes a potential 
trend which is not captured in the restricted sample of those aged 66 and over. Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based 
on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level, household size, employment status, and adjusted household 
disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 12 Well-being effects of TCT using longer periods with macro shocks controls, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2011 
Treated*2008 0.029 -0.149* -0.125** 0.067*  0.057+ -0.150* -0.114** 0.052+ 
 (0.033) (0.068) (0.039) (0.027)  (0.034) (0.070) (0.040) (0.028) 
Treated*2009 0.088** -0.134+ -0.140*** 0.029  0.109*** -0.120 -0.148*** 0.018 
 (0.032) (0.072) (0.041) (0.028)  (0.033) (0.074) (0.042) (0.029) 
Treated*2010 0.041 -0.134+ -0.057 0.042  0.069* -0.092 -0.055 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.069) (0.041) (0.029)  (0.033) (0.071) (0.043) (0.031) 
Treated*2011 0.032 -0.185** -0.100* 0.050+  0.052 -0.142* -0.078+ 0.036 
 (0.036) (0.070) (0.041) (0.029)  (0.037) (0.071) (0.042) (0.031) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*After*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Year*GDP growth rate Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11713 9977 11713 11642  11710 9974 11710 11639 
Adj. R2 0.431 0.088 0.081 0.105  0.439 0.089 0.088 0.108 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2012~2013, 2015~2016 
Treated*2013 -0.105*** -0.019 -0.006 0.003  -0.103*** -0.047 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.054) (0.032) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.055) (0.033) (0.020) 
Treated*2015 -0.087** -0.139* -0.110** 0.058*  -0.075** -0.194** -0.112** 0.066** 
 (0.028) (0.060) (0.035) (0.023)  (0.028) (0.062) (0.036) (0.024) 
Treated*2016 -0.041 -0.214** -0.161*** 0.083***  -0.036 -0.253*** -0.157*** 0.093*** 
 (0.033) (0.067) (0.038) (0.025)  (0.034) (0.070) (0.040) (0.026) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*After*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Year*GDP growth rate Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 14888 13115 14888 14888  14888 13115 14888 14888 
Adj. R2 0.432 0.061 0.064 0.101  0.437 0.061 0.070 0.104 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted 
household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table 13 Well-being effects of TCT controlling for CI deciles, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2011 
Treated*After*CI1 0.006 -0.135 -0.285*** 0.118***  0.021 -0.171* -0.281*** 0.108** 
 (0.040) (0.086) (0.047) (0.035)  (0.041) (0.086) (0.048) (0.035) 
Treated*After*CI3 -0.012 -0.113 -0.186*** 0.044  -0.004 -0.144+ -0.195*** 0.038 
 (0.041) (0.086) (0.050) (0.035)  (0.042) (0.087) (0.050) (0.036) 
Treated*After*CI4 -0.007 -0.104 -0.074 0.028  -0.000 -0.127 -0.097+ 0.022 
 (0.039) (0.081) (0.049) (0.035)  (0.041) (0.083) (0.051) (0.036) 
Treated*After*CI5 0.087+ -0.201* -0.047 0.032  0.100* -0.229* -0.062 0.020 
 (0.049) (0.097) (0.061) (0.045)  (0.050) (0.099) (0.063) (0.046) 
Treated*After*CI6 0.048 -0.081 -0.096 0.004  0.063 -0.113 -0.106+ -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.099) (0.060) (0.041)  (0.059) (0.100) (0.061) (0.042) 
Treated*After*CI7 0.207*** -0.287* -0.055 0.019  0.218*** -0.310** -0.076 0.008 
 (0.051) (0.113) (0.055) (0.039)  (0.054) (0.115) (0.057) (0.041) 
Treated*After*CI8 0.230*** -0.287** -0.027 0.064  0.243*** -0.315** -0.040 0.055 
 (0.055) (0.107) (0.064) (0.048)  (0.056) (0.109) (0.066) (0.048) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*After*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.409 0.086 0.063 0.108  0.417 0.086 0.069 0.112 
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Table 13 Well-being effects of TCT controlling for CI deciles, OLS (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2012~2013, 2015~2016 
Treated*After*CI1 0.074*** -0.210*** -0.147*** 0.076***  -0.037 -0.224** -0.208*** 0.124*** 
 (0.019) (0.053) (0.030) (0.022)  (0.030) (0.075) (0.042) (0.030) 
Treated*After*CI2 0.098** -0.021 0.003 -0.014  -0.018 -0.038 -0.065 0.038 
 (0.033) (0.091) (0.052) (0.040)  (0.039) (0.105) (0.060) (0.045) 
Treated*After*CI3 0.175*** 0.036 0.026 -0.042+  0.043 0.006 -0.067 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.050) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.032) (0.076) (0.045) (0.032) 
Treated*After*CI4 0.128*** -0.050 -0.000 -0.021  0.004 -0.072 -0.079+ 0.036 
 (0.020) (0.052) (0.032) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.075) (0.043) (0.031) 
Treated*After*CI5 0.217*** 0.021 0.090* -0.087***  0.087* -0.010 0.000 -0.024 
 (0.025) (0.061) (0.037) (0.024)  (0.035) (0.086) (0.049) (0.034) 
Treated*After*CI6 0.236*** -0.231* 0.088+ -0.047  0.109* -0.262* 0.002 0.014 
 (0.044) (0.091) (0.049) (0.031)  (0.050) (0.108) (0.058) (0.039) 
Treated*After*CI7 0.425*** -0.173 0.154* -0.078+  0.300*** -0.206 0.068 -0.017 
 (0.060) (0.125) (0.067) (0.045)  (0.065) (0.139) (0.074) (0.050) 
Treated*After*CI8 0.532*** -0.123 0.231** -0.054  0.409*** -0.155 0.150+ 0.006 
 (0.074) (0.149) (0.081) (0.059)  (0.078) (0.160) (0.087) (0.064) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Treated*After*NP N N N N  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.480 0.059 0.054 0.095  0.487 0.059 0.061 0.098 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. CI1 represents a group with the lowest CI. In this way, CI2, CI2, CI3, 
CI4, CI5, CI6, CI7 CI8 represent each group of with the decile of CI. In 2007, CI1 absorbs CI2. Treated is an abbreviation for new 
beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic 
Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s 
contribution through employment. Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, 
employment status, and adjusted household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001  
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Table 14 Well-being effects of TCT using different cutoffs of CI, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A1. 70% of CI, Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.046 -0.150* -0.135*** 0.045+  0.052 -0.172* -0.154*** 0.043 
 
(0.031) (0.068) (0.037) (0.026)  (0.033) (0.069) (0.039) (0.027) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.019 0.155 0.161* -0.021 
      (0.045) (0.101) (0.064) (0.048) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6185 5191 6185 6123  6182 5188 6182 6120 
Adj. R2 0.408 0.100 0.056 0.107  0.413 0.100 0.062 0.111 
 
 
A2. 90% of CI, Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.069* -0.152** -0.121*** 0.039+  0.079** -0.178** -0.137*** 0.034 
 
(0.027) (0.058) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.029) (0.060) (0.035) (0.024) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.031 0.161+ 0.151** -0.001 
      (0.041) (0.088) (0.058) (0.042) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7850 6659 7850 7769  7847 6656 7847 7766 
Adj. R2 0.408 0.091 0.066 0.114  0.416 0.092 0.074 0.118 
 
A3. 100% of CI, Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.058* -0.135* -0.106*** 0.032  0.068* -0.163** -0.124*** 0.026 
 
(0.026) (0.055) (0.031) (0.022)  (0.027) (0.057) (0.033) (0.023) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.022 0.159+ 0.164** 0.011 
      (0.040) (0.086) (0.056) (0.040) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8621 7306 8621 8534  8618 7303 8618 8531 
Adj. R2 0.427 0.089 0.078 0.121  0.435 0.089 0.084 0.124 
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Table 14 Well-being effects of TCT using different cutoffs of CI, OLS (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B1. 70% of CI, Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.006 -0.067 -0.095* 0.050*  0.014 -0.095 -0.093* 0.053* 
 
(0.027) (0.065) (0.037) (0.026)  (0.028) (0.067) (0.038) (0.027) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.014 0.060 0.018 -0.018 
      (0.021) (0.054) (0.036) (0.025) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6989 6132 6989 6989  6989 6132 6989 6989 
Adj. R2 0.469 0.061 0.046 0.095  0.475 0.062 0.052 0.097 
 
 
B2. 90% of CI, Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.041 -0.092+ -0.104*** 0.047*  0.052+ -0.121* -0.104** 0.052* 
 
(0.026) (0.056) (0.031) (0.021)  (0.027) (0.058) (0.032) (0.023) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.017 0.070 0.023 -0.021 
      (0.021) (0.053) (0.035) (0.024) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7870 6930 7870 7870  7870 6930 7870 7870 
Adj. R2 0.480 0.060 0.066 0.109  0.486 0.061 0.073 0.111 
 
B3. 100% of CI, Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.042 -0.087 -0.095** 0.047*  0.051+ -0.113* -0.096** 0.052* 
 
(0.025) (0.054) (0.030) (0.021)  (0.026) (0.057) (0.031) (0.022) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.005 0.058 0.023 -0.022 
      (0.022) (0.053) (0.035) (0.024) 
After Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Treated Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8112 7129 8112 8112  8112 7129 8112 8112 
Adj. R2 0.501 0.059 0.070 0.114  0.507 0.060 0.077 0.116 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted 
household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 15 Well-being effects of TCT using different controls, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.063* -0.142* -0.119*** 0.046+  0.068* -0.170** -0.142*** 0.043+ 
 
(0.029) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.064) (0.037) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.005 0.181+ 0.184** -0.011 
 
     (0.042) (0.095) (0.060) (0.044) 
After 0.178*** 0.190*** 0.131*** -0.146***  0.169*** 0.194*** 0.123*** -0.140*** 
 (0.021) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018)  (0.021) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018) 
Treated -0.128*** 0.516*** 0.083* -0.079**  -0.096** 0.554*** 0.108** -0.094*** 
 (0.030) (0.067) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.032) (0.070) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      0.255*** -0.021 0.166*** -0.130*** 
 
     (0.033) (0.069) (0.036) (0.028) 
Treated*NP      -0.149** -0.252* -0.162* 0.096+ 
 
     (0.051) (0.113) (0.065) (0.051) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.403 0.062 0.064 0.089  0.412 0.062 0.070 0.093 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.017 -0.064 -0.094** 0.049*  0.029 -0.087 -0.092** 0.051* 
 
(0.025) (0.060) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.026) (0.062) (0.035) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.022 0.039 0.014 -0.017 
 
     (0.021) (0.053) (0.035) (0.025) 
After 0.150*** -0.001 0.097*** -0.065***  0.136*** 0.013 0.087** -0.061** 
 (0.022) (0.054) (0.028) (0.020)  (0.022) (0.054) (0.028) (0.019) 
Treated -0.317*** 0.041 -0.063+ 0.010  -0.295*** -0.001 -0.057 0.010 
 (0.025) (0.073) (0.033) (0.024)  (0.029) (0.078) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      0.169*** -0.141* 0.112*** -0.044+ 
 
     (0.031) (0.062) (0.030) (0.024) 
Treated*NP      -0.014 0.115 -0.005 -0.008 
       (0.035) (0.074) (0.038) (0.029) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.476 0.055 0.064 0.095  0.484 0.056 0.068 0.096 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Dummy for female, age, age squared, age squared, chronic disease, dummy for head of household, housing ownership statuses and 
household size are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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7. Falsification Test 
Focusing on the exogenous policy changes in TCT, an identical model in a different year period 
between 2010 and 2011 is used as a falsification test. For 2012, there was a presidential election and 
benefit increase in Basic Pension was one of the issues of the conservative party. For 2016-2017, there 
was a Korean candlelight protest that caused a significant social change in most aspects of Korean 
society. Thus, the period of 2010-2011 is considered as being free from political debates of the 
coverage expansion in 2008 under a democratic party and benefit increase in 2014 under a 
conservative party. 
In table 16, as before, columns (1) – (4) present results of DID considering only coverage 
expansion or benefit increase and columns (5) – (8) present results of DDD considering both policy 
changes and NP. Coverage expansion effects and benefit increase effects are in panel A and B, 
respectively. All coefficients of interactions between dummies of the treated of coverage expansion 
and benefit increase in columns (1) – (4) and in columns (5) – (8), holding the status of benefitting 
from NP constant, show effects on objective and subjective WB which are not different from zero. 
The results in table 13 support the finding that noisy data changes in TCT show unexpected effects on 
final outcomes, objective and subjective WB. 
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Table 16 Falsification test in the period of 2010-2011, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After -0.008 -0.047 -0.040 0.002  -0.017 -0.047 -0.018 -0.007 
 
(0.026) (0.054) (0.038) (0.024)  (0.028) (0.055) (0.039) (0.026) 
Treated*After*NP      0.036 0.000 -0.111+ 0.048 
 
     (0.037) (0.086) (0.059) (0.038) 
After 0.047* -0.006 0.033 -0.048**  0.047* -0.006 0.033 -0.047** 
 (0.020) (0.043) (0.027) (0.017)  (0.020) (0.043) (0.027) (0.017) 
Treated -0.088*** 0.366*** 0.037 -0.028  -0.046+ 0.418*** 0.044 -0.027 
 (0.024) (0.056) (0.034) (0.025)  (0.027) (0.061) (0.037) (0.027) 
NP      0.224*** 0.010 0.205*** -0.077** 
 
     (0.033) (0.070) (0.037) (0.026) 
Treated*NP      -0.120** -0.237* 0.012 -0.024 
 
     (0.046) (0.096) (0.058) (0.041) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4660 4009 4660 4660  4660 4009 4660 4660 
Adj. R2 0.450 0.071 0.067 0.100  0.460 0.074 0.077 0.103 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.033 0.034 0.025 -0.022  0.021 0.020 0.022 -0.025 
 
(0.030) (0.055) (0.037) (0.023)  (0.031) (0.056) (0.038) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      0.042 0.079 0.004 0.015 
 
     (0.028) (0.068) (0.046) (0.030) 
After 0.021 -0.059 -0.014 -0.025  0.023 -0.062 -0.014 -0.025 
 (0.027) (0.048) (0.031) (0.020)  (0.027) (0.048) (0.031) (0.020) 
Treated -0.260*** 0.141* -0.033 -0.049+  -0.222*** 0.104 -0.034 -0.040 
 (0.026) (0.062) (0.036) (0.025)  (0.030) (0.066) (0.040) (0.029) 
NP      0.172*** -0.232** 0.107* -0.037 
 
     (0.040) (0.075) (0.042) (0.027) 
Treated*NP      -0.074 0.087 0.031 -0.048 
       (0.048) (0.094) (0.056) (0.037) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 5066 4391 5066 5065  5066 4391 5066 5065 
Adj. R2 0.457 0.052 0.079 0.116  0.463 0.056 0.084 0.118 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age 
Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 
with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
Dummy for female, age, age squared, age squared, chronic disease, dummy for head of household, housing ownership statuses and 
household size employment status, and adjusted household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 
**p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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8. Mechanism 
As we observed how TCT developed for the elderly in South Korea, how to divide beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries, and which process is required for the applicants in section 2, TCT with an 
economic cutoff, including both BOAP and BP, has been developed in the process of political debates. 
Because of the budget constraints of national revenue without contributions of individuals, a rigid 
cutoff has been set and public servants require an applicant to submit in person detailed information 
about the income and assets of themselves and their adult children who are considered as responsible 
for their elderly parents.  
Walker et al. (2014) frame a mechanism of shaming people in poverty happening in administration 
procedure, saying below. 
 
“Policies that are not universally assessable but targeted on people in poverty are necessarily 
divisive, but they are often accompanied by the negative stereotyping and discrimination that 
transform shame into stigma (ibid, p.150).” 
 
“Given limited resources, procedures for the determining eligibility and entitlements are often 
detailed, driven by accountancy principles that sums should add up and be supported by 
evidenced documentation”, resulting in stigma, for example, “in systems based on discretion, 
either formal or more illicit, the limited funds available increase the power of gatekeepers 
and the prevalence of corruption. Either way, the message conveyed to applicants is less that 
‘you are welcome and these are your rights’ and more that ‘you have to justify your right to 
be here and to be claiming benefits’ (ibid, p.151)” 
 
Separating the vulnerable from normal citizens occurs if a reason for being poor is perceived as a 
result of personal weakness (Jorm & Griffiths, 2008). Widespread socio-cultural norms against 
vulnerable individuals at risk prevents them from access to public intervention (Jimenez et al., 2013; 
Knight et al., 2016). As a means-tested procedure, TCT with cutoff judges potential beneficiaries in 
poverty from the population not in poverty, giving beneficiaries a certain amount of transfer with a 
duty to justify their vulnerability and the rejected public approval regarding their higher economic 
rank. 
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Figure 3 Framing and Shaming against people in poverty  
 
Source: Walker. (2014). The Shame of Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.159. 
 
As Walker et al. (2014) point out, not only TCT itself but the media may communicate that the 
higher benefit means more tax burden for taxpayers. It spreads negative attitudes toward the new 
policy for both potential beneficiaries themselves and all people in the nation including adult children 
or neighbors of the potential beneficiaries, resulting in a social separation (Besley & Coate, 1992; Liu, 
Zhang & Zhang, 2005; Walker 2014). Iles et al. (2017) support the mechanism with empirical 
evidence that stigmatizing public announcements reinforce negative attitudes towards people with 
eating disorders. Reviewing studies, Baumeister et al., (2001) find that bad experiences are much 
stronger than good experiences for shaping emotional reaction, which is in line with the idea that 
individuals are highly likely to avoid a sure loss instead of taking a risk for unsure gain (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003). The whole procedure of separating and shaming people in poverty 
by targeted policies is summarized in figure 2.  
In Korea, policy changes of coverage expansion and benefit increase are formed through political 
debates in parliament and media. Figure 3 shows the yearly frequency of news articles containing 
BOAP and BP as keywords. In 2008 of the coverage expansion, the frequency of news articles 
regarding BOAP is somewhat stable across years with a little hill in the year of the policy change. 
Around 2014 of the benefit increase, however, the frequency of news articles regarding BP shows a 
prominent peak after 2013. This is plausible to make people exposed to the political debates not only 
about poverty reduction of the elderly as a pro of benefit increase but also about additional tax burden 
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of taxpayers, resulting in stigmatization (Besley, 1992; Liu, Zhang & Zhang, 2005; Stuber & 
Schlesinger, 2006). 
 
Figure 4 Yearly frequency of news articles regarding TCT, 2006-2017 
 
Note: Yearly frequency of news articles regarding Basic Old-Age Pension in 2008 and Basic Pension in 2014 is in Y-axis 
Source: News Bigdata & Analysis (www.kinds.or.kr extracted on 27. Dec. 2018) 
 
Furthermore, as we discovered, coverage expansion and benefit increase of TCT decreases private 
transfers, which is used as a proxy variable of relationships between old parents and adult children 
who do not live together (Kim & Kim, 2003; Lee et al., 2014; Lee, 2017) and harms the subjective 
WB of beneficiaries in section 5. The possibility of beneficiaries feeling stigma due to changed 
policies needs to be investigated. 
Stigma is defined as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting” and that reduces the bearer “from a 
whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (Goffman , 1963, p.3) and this stigmatizing 
happens at an individual level in social contexts of expanded family members and social relationships. 
To examine the possible mechanism of stigmatizing, two dimensions of self-esteem are used as 
proxies for stigma (Owens, 1993; Owens, 1994; Kahng, 2006). The first dimension is the negative of 
self-esteem, using the mean value of the four questions of ‘I feel I do not have much to be proud of’, 
‘Sometimes I think I am no good at all’, ‘I feel that I can’t do anything right’ and ‘I feel that my life is 
not very useful’, measured on a 1-4 scale. The second dimension is the positive dimension of self-
esteem, using the mean value of the four questions of ‘I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an 
equal plane with others’ ‘I feel that I have a number of good qualities’, ‘I am able to do things as well 
as most other people’, and ‘I take a positive attitude toward myself’, measured on a 1-4 scale. In both 
measurements, higher scores mean more negative and more positive self-esteem. 
In addition to these two dimensions of self-esteem as proxies of stigma, satisfaction with social 
connections, the satisfaction of relationship with family members within the same household, and 
satisfaction of relationship with adult children are also used as dependent variables in table 17. In 
columns (1) – (5) the results considering only coverage expansion in 2008 and benefit increase in 
2014 are presented and the results considering both policy changes and NP based on contribution is 
presented in columns (6) – (10). In column (1) coverage expansion has a positive effect on negative 
self-esteem at the 1% significance level in panel A. Benefit increase in column (2) shows a negative 
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effect on positive self-esteem in the marginal level. These imply policy changes may harm the self-
esteem of the treated. In column (3) both policy changes have negative effects on satisfaction with 
social connections at the 5% significance level, adding evidence for stigmatizing effect of the policy 
changes. In column (5) coverage expansion decreases the satisfaction of relationships with adult 
children at the 1% significance level, which is consistent with crowding out effects on private 
transfers as a proxy of the relationship between old parents and adult children (Kim & Kim, 2003; Lee 
et al., 2014; Lee, 2017). 
When considering both policy changes and NP based on individuals’ own contributions, coverage 
expansion has a positive effect on negative self-esteem at the 1% significance level. In the case of 
benefit increase, it has a negative effect on positive self-esteem at the marginal significance level. For 
satisfaction with social connection, both coverage expansion and benefit increase have negative 
impacts at the 5% significance level, respectively. Coverage expansion decreases satisfaction with 
adult children at the 1% significance level, holding NP constant. This pattern is consistent with the 
crowding out of private transfers when coverage of TCT has been expanded. 
These effect patterns make sense in that policy changes requiring political attention and 
government revenue were dealt with as a popular issue in the media before the determination of 
policy changes in 2007 and 2013. To apply the expanded coverage up to 70% of calculated income in 
2008, applicants must visit Community Service Centers or NP Provincial Centers in person and have 
face-to-face interview with public servants, providing detailed information about the income and 
assets of themselves and their adult children, feeling they are revealed with their vulnerability to 
tangible persons, civil servants. To keep their eligibility to the changed policy and benefitting from the 
increased transfers in 2014, beneficiaries are not responsible to prove their vulnerability but to check 
their bank accounts without exposure to others. However, the frequency of relative news articles 
surged to the peak in figure 3, making beneficiaries of the TCT exposed to the public and taxpayers 
aware of their additional tax burden.
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Table 17 Mechanisms of Well-being effects, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
DD 
 
DDD 
  
Negative 
self-esteem 
Positive 
self-esteem 
Satisfaction of 
social 
connections 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with family 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with children 
 
Negative 
self-esteem 
Positive 
self-esteem 
Satisfaction of 
social 
connections 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with family 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with children 
A. Coverage Expansion, 2007~2009 
Treated*After 0.088** 0.006 -0.090* 0.112 -0.166**  0.082** 0.002 -0.088* 0.101 -0.180** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.040) (0.078) (0.063)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.082) (0.066) 
Treated*After*NP       0.007 0.046 -0.006 0.109 0.141 
       (0.045) (0.050) (0.069) (0.131) (0.107) 
After -0.183*** -0.014 -0.048+ 0.178** 0.153**  -0.176*** -0.020 -0.054+ 0.165** 0.139** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.057) (0.048)  (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.057) (0.047) 
Treated -0.147*** 0.044 0.077* 0.067 0.382***  -0.159*** 0.057* 0.074+ 0.097 0.415*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.078) (0.068)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.082) (0.072) 
NP       -0.170*** 0.131*** 0.122** 0.272*** 0.330*** 
       (0.027) (0.031) (0.039) (0.069) (0.070) 
Treated*NP       0.078 -0.083 0.030 -0.169 -0.199 
       (0.050) (0.058) (0.070) (0.142) (0.124) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7013 7012 7052 6204 6806  7010 7009 7049 6201 6803 
Adj. R2 0.089 0.096 0.044 0.042 0.084  0.096 0.100 0.047 0.046 0.089 
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Table 17 Mechanisms of Well-being effects, OLS (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 DD  DDD 
  
Negative 
self-esteem 
Positive 
self-esteem 
Satisfaction of 
social 
connections 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with family 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with children 
 
Negative 
self-esteem 
Positive 
self-esteem 
Satisfaction of 
social 
connections 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with family 
Satisfaction of 
relationships 
with children 
B. Benefit Increase, 2013, 2015 
Treated*After 0.022 -0.055+ -0.071* 0.028 -0.004  0.021 -0.051+ -0.086* 0.042 0.016 
 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.035) (0.060) (0.054)  (0.026) (0.030) (0.037) (0.063) (0.057) 
Treated*After*NP       -0.004 -0.013 0.070* -0.013 -0.054 
 
      (0.027) (0.029) (0.035) (0.061) (0.061) 
After -0.106*** -0.021 0.025 0.053 0.078+  -0.101*** -0.026 0.016 0.032 0.062 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.031) (0.052) (0.046)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.031) (0.052) (0.045) 
Treated 0.076** 0.007 -0.036 -0.141* -0.040  0.078** -0.004 -0.028 -0.119+ -0.045 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.034) (0.063) (0.061)  (0.027) (0.032) (0.037) (0.068) (0.066) 
NP       -0.063** 0.051+ 0.089** 0.230*** 0.173** 
 
      (0.023) (0.027) (0.033) (0.059) (0.057) 
Treated*NP       -0.025 0.053 -0.004 -0.015 0.069 
       (0.030) (0.035) (0.042) (0.073) (0.070) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 7479 7479 7350 7269  7479 7479 7479 7350 7269 
Adj. R2 0.098 0.114 0.048 0.047 0.061  0.102 0.118 0.053 0.052 0.065 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and 
ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. Dummy 
for female, age, age squared, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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9. Conclusion 
This study examined the effects of TCT on the objective and subjective well-being of policy 
beneficiaries by utilizing two types of exogenous policy changes within a policy: coverage expansion 
and benefit increase. Targeted cash transfers for seniors in Korea has been developed under the 
purpose of poverty reduction. However, the poverty rate of the elderly remains still high (OECD, 
2018; Yeo & Jeon, 2017). Not only such a macro consequence, but the undignified means-tested TCT 
with cutoff dividing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by requiring applicants to justify their right to 
claim benefits also may lead stigmatization of beneficiaries. Using exogenous policy changes of 
coverage expansion in 2008 and benefit increase in 2014, and DID controlling for the trend of overall 
improvements in objective and subjective WB between the treated and the controlled, it is determined 
that the changes of the treated, new beneficiaries of coverage expansion and ongoing beneficiaries of 
benefit increase, are smaller than those of the controlled: Crowding out of private transfers, 
compensating the loss of household income, lower life satisfaction and higher depression. 
This unintended effect of additional targeted cash transfers with the financial cutoff for seniors 
across different types of policy changes, behind mechanisms for stigmatization are investigated via 
possible paths of contributions through employment, reduced self-esteem as proxies for stigma and 
satisfaction with social connections and with family members or adult children. In this line, when 
controlling beneficiaries from both TCTs and NP based on contribution, policy changes in TCT show 
unexpected effect patterns on the objective and subjective well-being of beneficiaries. With respect to 
stigma, benefiting from exogenous changes in TCTs has a positive effect on negative self-esteem of 
the treated, leaving the difference in changes of positive self-esteem of the treated relatively intact. 
Both coverage expansion and benefit increase have negative effects on satisfaction with social 
connections of the treated at significant levels. What is also noticeable is that the coverage expansion 
of TCT leads to lower satisfaction with adult children not living together. This may be connected with 
crowded out private transfers, which is considered as a proxy for the relationship between old parents 
and adult children (Kim & Kim, 2003; Lee et al., 2014; Lee, 2017).  
The empirical findings of this study are threefold. First, it investigates the effects of TCT on 
objective well-being. Coverage expansion and benefit increase both crowd out private transfers as in 
the literature (Jensen, 2003) but coverage expansion increases the final disposable household income 
and benefit increase compensates the decreased private transfer. Effects on household income, 
however, cannot be said to be robust across analysis settings. Thus, additional TCT functions as a 
temporary remedy for the high level of poverty of the elderly in Korea. Second, targeting beneficiaries 
with decisive cutoff discriminates beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, resulting in less subjective 
well-being of the treated. Consequently, not enough amount of targeting benefits divides society into 
groups, shaming the vulnerable (Qi & Wu, 2018). Last, individuals’ own contributions through 
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employment legitimates the qualification for the additional cash transfer of beneficiaries. The impact 
of coverage expansion on life satisfaction of the treated is positive in results of DDD.  
This study made two contributions in methodology and policy implication. First, this finds effects 
of two representative types of policy changes of TCT, coverage expansion and benefit increase within 
a policy, by using DID and DDD with consistency across robustness checks and falsification tests. 
Second, this study provides empirical evidence for the unintended effects of TCT on the well-being of 
the treated defined accompanying the two exogenous policy changes. By comparing the two types of 
policy changes, not enough amounts of additional cash transfers with financial cutoff have limitations 
to solve the target problem, senior poverty. During the two types of policy changes, coverage 
expansion in 2008 and benefit increase in 2014, each benefit only accounts for 11.6% and 21.3% of 
relative poverty lines of each year, respectively. Moreover, the poverty rate of seniors in Korea 
remains still high (Yeo & Jeon, 2017). In spite of a temporal increase in disposable household income 
due to the policy changes, crowding out private transfers as a factor of household income remains a 
problem not completely solved.  
Moreover, targeting with clear cutoff stigmatizes beneficiaries, lowering their life satisfaction. The 
application process of face-to-face interviews for claiming benefits by applicants, and political 
arguments or news reports of media can be the source of administrative and social stigmatization, 
which is the side-effect of residual welfare programs. However, recalling that the policy change 
effects whose benefit from NP among the treated are positive for subjective WB, life satisfaction, a 
policy approach legitimating beneficiaries to their right to claim additional cash transfer is required. 
In this line, possible policy implications may be considered. First, the guarantee of applicants’ 
‘dignity’ should be treated as a fundamental principle so as to remove the stigmatizing mechanism of 
coverage expansion. Considering the application process requiring applicants to visit administrative 
institutions in person with application forms containing personal and their adult children’s financial 
information, a non-face-to-face application procedure can be considered. It can be possible online or 
by public servants visiting a place applicants choose. 
Second, yearly frequencies of news articles conveying references to BOAP in 2007 and BP 2013.7.-
2014.6, respectively, found a need for attention regarding media delivering political debates and 
shaping social values. In 2007, a by-election took place in April and a presidential election was in 
December. In between July of 2013 and June of 2014, September was the first month of the budget 
session of the parliament, and more news regarding government policies are likely to be reported in 
each period. As reported in Clair et al. (2016), stigma can be reduced by social messages with expert 
knowledge about stigmatizing mechanisms and new cultural construction regarding existing 
ideologies of the vulnerable.  
Third, a contribution through a tax on increased benefit can be considered to lead the civic 
participation of all beneficiaries. In this case, there is a room for an increase in the level of benefit 
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amount so as to reduce gaps between benefit and poverty line and to reduce the high poverty rate of 
seniors in Korea. 
With the findings and contributions of this study, limitations remain, leaving a need for further 
studies. First, it can be said that the more appropriate period for the falsification test for benefit 
increase is after the policy implementation for coverage expansion in this study. However, the period 
of 2010-2011 is used because of data availability. 2016 is the year of the candlelight protest which 
was an influential social movement in Korea, 2017 was the year of the early presidential election and 
2018 was a year of small amount of benefit increase, so that it seems to be difficult to utilize another 
period for the falsification test of benefit increase. Second, since this study focused on the effects of 
targeted cash transfer with a cutoff and the obligation to prove the personal economic weakness of 
applicants, the opposite case without a cutoff can be an alternative as expanded evidence.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Poverty rates of the elderly of OECD countries 
 
Note: Relative Poverty rates are shown with poverty line of 50% of median household income after taxes and transfers. 
Reference years are different over countries from 2013 of Brazil to 2016 of Finland and Latvia due to data availability. 
Poverty rate of South Korea is of 2015. 
Source: OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database extracted on 26 Sep 2018 
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Table A1 Post-policy changes summary statistics over groups of treatment and control groups in 2008-9, 2015 
Group Stat. Objective  
Well-Being 
 Subjective Well-Being Dummy 
for 
Female 
Age Dummy 
for 
Chronic 
Disease 
Dummy 
for 
having 
partner 
Education level Hhld 
size 
Employment status Adjusted  
disposable 
hhld  
income 
(DI-
Benefit 
from TCT) 
Disposable  
hhld 
income 
(DI) 
Private  
Transfer 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Depression Primary 
school or 
below 
Middle 
school 
High 
school 
or 
above 
workers Unemployed Out-of-
labor 
force 
Panel A. Coverage Expansion, 2008-2009                
Treated Obs. 1735 1735  1974 1957 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1974 1735 
 Mean 120.7  2.5   3.1  1.7  0.68  74.2  0.84  0.53  0.39  0.12  0.11  1.95  0.22  0.01  0.78  29.9  
 S.D. 100.3  3.6   0.7  0.6  0.46  5.8  0.36  0.50  0.49  0.32  0.31  1.03  0.41  0.07  0.42  130.9  
 Min. -26.3  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -152.1  
 Max. 814.7  45.0   5 3.7  1 97 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 778.2  
                   
Treated*NP Obs. 2077 2077  2171 2152 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2171 2077 
 Mean 120.7  3.3   3.0  1.7  0.70  74.2  0.83  0.50  0.42  0.08  0.08  2.02  0.34  0.01  0.65  -3.4  
 S.D. 118.4  3.5   0.7  0.5  0.46  5.7  0.37  0.50  0.49  0.28  0.27  1.11  0.47  0.10  0.48  127.0  
 Min. -35.9  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -183.7  
 Max. 2285.1  43.1   5 3.8  1 101 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 2182.5  
                   
NP only Obs. 413 413  417 415 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 417 413 
 Mean 137.1  2.7   3.3  1.6  0.41  70.0  0.78  0.64  0.44  0.18  0.13  2.14  0.58  0.02  0.41  4.4  
 S.D. 106.9  2.7   0.6  0.5  0.49  3.3  0.42  0.48  0.50  0.38  0.34  1.08  0.49  0.14  0.49  115.9  
 Min. 5.6  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -179.617 
 Max. 1007.3  16.4   5 3.8  1 88 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 872.8  
                   
Non-Treated 
*non-NP 
Obs. 
484 484  511 510 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 511 484  
 Mean 175.1  2.8   3.3  1.5  0.35  70.0  0.80  0.70  0.33  0.15  0.34  2.16  0.41  0.01  0.58  114.9  
 S.D. 124.1  3.2   0.7  0.5  0.48  3.5  0.40  0.46  0.47  0.36  0.47  1.05  0.49  0.09  0.49  155.2  
 Min. 14.9  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -145.783 
 Max. 807.8  29.7   5 3.6  1 83 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 774.9  
                   
Total Obs. 4709 4709  5073 5034 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 5073 4709  
 Mean 127.7  2.9   3.1  1.7  0.63  73.4  0.83  0.54  0.40  0.11  0.12  2.01  0.32  0.01  0.67  21.7  
 S.D. 112.9  3.4   0.7  0.5  0.48  5.7  0.38  0.50  0.49  0.32  0.33  1.07  0.47  0.10  0.47  135.2  
 Min. -35.9  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -183.667 
 Max. 2285.1  45.0   5 3.8  1 101 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 2182.5  
 
  
  
52 
Table A1 Post-policy changes summary statistics over groups of treatment and control groups in 2008-9, 2015 (Cont’d) 
Group Stat. Objective  
Well-Being 
 Subjective Well-Being Dummy 
for 
Female 
Age Dummy 
for 
Chronic 
Disease 
Dummy 
for 
having 
partner 
Education level Hhld 
size 
Employment status Adjusted  
disposable 
hhld  
income 
(DI-
Benefit 
from TCT) 
Disposable  
hhld 
income 
(DI) 
Private  
Transfer 
 Life 
satisfaction 
Depression Primary 
school or 
below 
Middle 
school 
High 
school 
or 
above 
workers Unemployed Out-of-
labor 
force 
Panel B. Benefit Increase, 2015                
Treated Obs. 434 434  458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 458 434 
 Mean 206.8  4.2   3.6  1.4  0.76  74.5  0.85  0.72  0.44  0.19  0.20  2.03  0.29  0.00  0.71  111.4  
 S.D. 132.9  5.9   0.6  0.5  0.43  5.7  0.36  0.45  0.50  0.40  0.40  0.85  0.46  0.00  0.46  214.9  
 Min. -4.8  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -314.6  
 Max. 801.0  54.5   5 3.6  1 95 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 0 1 795.4  
                   
Treated*NP Obs. 2083 2083  2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2083 
 Mean 133.7  2.8   3.3  1.6  0.74  76.6  0.89  0.47  0.45  0.13  0.10  1.84  0.25  0.00  0.75  -146.1  
 S.D. 122.7  2.9   0.7  0.5  0.44  5.9  0.31  0.50  0.50  0.33  0.30  1.00  0.43  0.04  0.43  166.9  
 Min. 14.7  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -554.7  
 Max. 2556.3  24.7   5 3.7  1 107 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 2294.5  
                   
NP only Obs. 734 734  775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 734 
 Mean 152.0  2.9   3.5  1.4  0.47  73.0  0.88  0.55  0.46  0.16  0.16  1.87  0.45  0.00  0.55  -135.6  
 S.D. 99.5  3.2   0.6  0.5  0.50  4.3  0.32  0.50  0.50  0.37  0.37  0.87  0.50  0.05  0.50  139.8  
 Min. 28.3  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -523.267 
 Max. 905.6  27.1   5 3.9  1 86 1 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 608.9  
                   
Non-Treated 
*non-NP 
Obs. 
408 408  434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 434 408  
 Mean 229.0  3.0   3.6  1.3  0.32  72.2  0.82  0.71  0.30  0.22  0.39  2.02  0.40  0.00  0.59  148.0  
 S.D. 141.4  3.8   0.6  0.4  0.47  4.7  0.39  0.46  0.46  0.42  0.49  0.93  0.49  0.05  0.49  214.1  
 Min. -96.3  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -472.5 
 Max. 912.6  36.7   5 3.4  1 93 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 906.3  
                   
Total Obs. 3659 3659  3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3942 3659  
 Mean 156.7  3.0   3.4  1.5  0.64  75.1  0.88  0.54  0.43  0.15  0.15  1.89  0.31  0.00  0.69  -80.7  
 S.D. 126.7  3.6   0.7  0.5  0.48  5.7  0.33  0.50  0.50  0.36  0.36  0.95  0.46  0.04  0.46  208.8  
 Min. -96.3  0.0   1 1.0  0 66 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 -554.667 
 Max. 2556.3  54.5   5 3.9  1 107 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 2294.5  
Note: Main analysis sample is restricted to those aged 66 and over, excluding top 20% of CI. Treated is abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and 
ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. 
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Table A2 Well-being effects of TCT, FE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.052* -0.200*** -0.045 0.014  0.060* -0.217*** -0.062+ 0.006 
 
(0.025) (0.052) (0.034) (0.024)  (0.027) (0.054) (0.036) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.048 0.099 0.131* 0.046 
 
     (0.042) (0.094) (0.063) (0.044) 
NP      -0.015 -0.032 -0.162* 0.043 
 
     (0.052) (0.120) (0.079) (0.051) 
Treated*NP      0.020 -0.011 0.224+ -0.234** 
 
     (0.076) (0.174) (0.127) (0.087) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.052 0.040 0.007 0.022  0.051 0.040 0.009 0.024 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.064** -0.112* -0.033 0.018  0.069** -0.126* -0.034 0.022 
 
(0.022) (0.053) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.022) (0.056) (0.035) (0.024) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.016 0.056 0.017 -0.031 
 
     (0.022) (0.056) (0.038) (0.027) 
NP      0.009 0.121 0.128 -0.141* 
 
     (0.070) (0.234) (0.111) (0.072) 
Treated*NP      0.014 -0.181 -0.197 0.175+ 
 
     (0.081) (0.253) (0.134) (0.092) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.082 0.024 0.013 0.016  0.082 0.024 0.014 0.017 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in 
January of 2008 with coverage expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. 
NP is an abbreviation for National Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. Dummy for female, age, 
age squared, chronic disease, marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted household disposable income 
(not for column 1 and 5) are controlled. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01  
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Table A3 Well-being effects of TCT on adjusted disposable household income, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log adjusted  
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log adjusted  
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.756*** -0.161* -0.130*** 0.051*  0.881*** -0.186** -0.150*** 0.046+ 
 
(0.091) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024)  (0.093) (0.064) (0.037) (0.025) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.636*** 0.172+ 0.163** -0.001 
 
     (0.157) (0.093) (0.059) (0.044) 
After -0.684*** 0.202*** 0.131*** -0.144***  -0.724*** 0.203*** 0.122*** -0.138*** 
 (0.069) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018)  (0.069) (0.050) (0.025) (0.018) 
Treated -1.705*** 0.585*** 0.105** -0.092***  -1.576*** 0.621*** 0.131*** -0.106*** 
 (0.088) (0.066) (0.034) (0.026)  (0.092) (0.068) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      1.195*** 0.018 0.188*** -0.137*** 
 
     (0.115) (0.069) (0.037) (0.028) 
Treated*NP      -0.569** -0.247* -0.172** 0.098+ 
 
     (0.178) (0.110) (0.064) (0.051) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982  7050 5965 7050 6979 
Adj. R2 0.319 0.095 0.060 0.108  0.338 0.096 0.066 0.112 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
DD  DDD 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log 
private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
 Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Treated*After 0.799*** -0.090 -0.096** 0.047*  0.867*** -0.116+ -0.095** 0.051* 
 
(0.089) (0.060) (0.033) (0.023)  (0.091) (0.062) (0.035) (0.024) 
Treated*After*NP      -0.170* 0.056 0.016 -0.019 
 
     (0.076) (0.053) (0.035) (0.025) 
After -0.590*** 0.011 0.093*** -0.061**  -0.623*** 0.021 0.082** -0.057** 
 (0.082) (0.053) (0.028) (0.019)  (0.082) (0.053) (0.028) (0.019) 
Treated -3.942*** 0.072 -0.076* 0.010  -3.856*** 0.027 -0.070+ 0.011 
 (0.069) (0.073) (0.033) (0.025)  (0.087) (0.078) (0.036) (0.027) 
NP      0.361*** -0.100 0.122*** -0.042+ 
 
     (0.107) (0.061) (0.030) (0.024) 
Treated*NP      -0.159 0.137+ 0.013 -0.018 
 
     (0.118) (0.074) (0.038) (0.029) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7479 6588 7479 7479  7479 6588 7479 7479 
Adj. R2 0.570 0.060 0.057 0.103  0.572 0.061 0.064 0.105 
Note: Column (2)-(4) and (6)-(8), identical with those in table 6, are included for readability. Clustered standard errors within households 
are in parentheses. Treated is an abbreviation for new beneficiaries of Basic Old Age Pension implemented in January of 2008 with coverage 
expansion, and ongoing beneficiaries of Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. NP is an abbreviation for National 
Pension based on individual and employer’s contribution through employment. Dummy for female, age, age squared, chronic disease, 
marital status, education level household size, employment status, and adjusted household disposable income (not for column 1 and 5) are 
controlled. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table A4 Well-being effects of controls, OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BOAP, 2007-2009  BP, 2013, 2015 
  
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Log 
disposable 
household 
income 
Log private 
transfer 
Life 
satisfaction 
Depression 
Female -0.141*** -0.096+ -0.049+ 0.218*** -0.179*** -0.059 -0.023 0.204*** 
 (0.025) (0.052) (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) (0.042) (0.021) (0.016) 
Age -0.144*** 0.171* 0.005 0.035 -0.125*** 0.332*** 0.010 0.045* 
 
(0.039) (0.076) (0.040) (0.031) (0.027) (0.058) (0.028) (0.020) 
Age squared 
/100 
0.084** -0.110* -0.007 -0.020 0.071*** -0.210*** -0.009 -0.023+ 
 (0.026) (0.050) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.038) (0.018) (0.013) 
Head of 
household 
-0.133*** -0.181** -0.022 0.052* -0.121*** -0.186*** -0.011 0.071*** 
 
(0.027) (0.056) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.017) 
Housing (Ref. living in housing for free) 
Ownership 0.100*** -0.024 0.085** -0.042+ 0.120*** -0.004 0.105*** -0.027 
 (0.027) (0.057) (0.029) (0.024) (0.021) (0.046) (0.027) (0.021) 
One-time 
deposit 
-0.087* -0.217* -0.140** 0.082* -0.083* -0.297*** -0.086* 0.086** 
 
(0.036) (0.091) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036) (0.080) (0.041) (0.030) 
Rented 
month 
-0.048 -0.469*** -0.276*** 0.135*** -0.070* -0.563*** -0.268*** 0.179*** 
 
(0.038) (0.093) (0.042) (0.036) (0.027) (0.076) (0.037) (0.028) 
Household 
size 
0.338*** -0.108** -0.064*** 0.004 0.356*** -0.145*** -0.047*** -0.015+ 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.028) (0.012) (0.008) 
Log of 
adjusted 
hhld 
disposable 
income  
 0.008 0.039*** -0.021***  -0.012 0.028*** -0.006+ 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 10.004*** -5.334+ 3.184* 0.148 9.743*** -11.494*** 3.209** -0.746 
 
(1.443) (2.840) (1.495) (1.155) (1.030) (2.206) (1.056) (0.767) 
Observations 7053 5968 7053 6982 7479 6588 7479 7479 
adj. R2 0.401 0.034 0.063 0.088 0.442 0.056 0.061 0.094 
Note: Clustered standard errors within households are in parentheses. BOAP is an abbreviation for Basic Old Age Pension implemented in 
January of 2008 with coverage expansion and BP is an the abbreviation for Basic Pension implemented in July of 2014 with benefit increase. 
+p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Chapter 2 
 
Unemployment and Subjective Well-Being: The Role of 
Unemployment Benefit in South Korea 
 
1. Motivation 
Modern society conditions human beings to labor (Arendt, 1958).
3
 Employment provides 
individuals not only the financial capability to maintain their daily lives but also social inclusion and 
shared humanity, allowing individuals to enjoy a satisfactory life. In other words, a transition to 
unemployment may block the unemployed from both pecuniary and honorary normality, in theory. An 
empirical study based on this theory about the harmful effects of exclusion from employment 
strengthens the argument to change policy design to mediate the negative events that occur in the 
course of human life. 
There are two branches of explanation about the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
physical/psychological health: Social Causation and Health Selection. To be specific, the social 
causation hypothesis supports the idea that a person’s socioeconomic status affects their health. The 
health selection hypothesis, meanwhile, argues that a person’s health affects their socioeconomic 
status. When examining these two ideas, Bartley (1988) finds that the literature puts more emphasis 
on social causation, in that unemployment does more likely lead to more stress, than the health 
selection hypothesis. In empirical studies, social causation is also the preferred theory when 
researching those in the transition from adulthood to old age, whereas both social causation and health 
selection are equally important for those transitioning from childhood to adulthood (Hoffman et al., 
2018; Hoffman et al., 2019). These findings regarding the relationship between socioeconomic status 
and psychiatric disorders are consistent in different socioeconomic contexts, for example, Oslo in the 
1980-1990s (Johnson, et al., 1999), Germany (Krug & Eberl, 2018), and the U.S. (Stewart et al., 
2013). 
Focusing on the social causation hypothesis, a number of studies have accumulated that argue for 
the effects of unemployment on individual subjective well-being (SWB), as outcome values of 
experienced utility (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006) or as the average welfare of an individual employee 
(Aghion et al., 2016). The first group of studies examines the effects of poor quality of individual 
                                           
3 Hannah Arendt, a Jewish philosopher, 1906-1975, accounts for conditions for a human being as labor, work, and (political) 
action. Labor, which is inferior to work which allows someone to discover their self-identity as a unique and unexchangeable 
being, especially has become more highlighted in modern societies through industrialization for individuals to make a living 
[The Human Condition, 1958] 
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employment on SWB. These studies show that non-standard employment (Quesnel-Vallée et al., 2010; 
Winkler et al., 2018), workforce reduction (Patel et al., 2018; Reichert & Tauchmann, 2017), job 
insecurity (Burgard et al., 2009; Dawson, et al., 2015; De-Witte, 1999; Emberland & Rundmo, 2010; 
Emerson et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2012; László et al., 2010; Moscone et al., 2016; Reichert & 
Tauchmann, 2017) and economic insecurity (Fiori et al., 2016) reduce individual SWB or health. 
These studies imply that there may be negative effects of unemployment on individual experienced 
utility. 
The second group of studies shows the direct effects of unemployment on SWB, examining the 
effects of gender differences and the national/regional unemployment rates. Being unemployed 
decreases individual SWB (Chadi & Hetschko, 2017; Carroll, 2007; Drydakis, 2015; Gerlach & 
Stephan, 1996; Kassenboehmer & Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Krug & Eberl, 2018; Shields & Price, 2005; 
Voßemer et al., 2018; Watson & Osberg, 2017; Winkelmann, 2009; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 
1998) and psychological health (Gebel & Voßchmitz, 2014; Paul & Moser, 2009; Tak et al., 2006). It 
also leads to more feelings of separation from society (Contini & Richiardi, 2012; Kunze & Suppa, 
2017) and negative subjective well-being, such as unhappiness or mental distress (Clark & Oswald, 
1994; Korpi, 1997; Helliwell & Huang, 2014). Even past unemployment experiences can have a 
negative impact on current life satisfaction (Clark et al., 2001; Knabe & Rätzel, 2011a; Mousteri et al., 
2018) and a transition to employment improves mental health (Curnock et al., 2016). Unemployment 
may decrease wage, thereby harming economic security. It may also separate individuals from 
mainstream society. 
There are studies showing that being unemployed has more of a negative impact on men than 
women (Artazcoz et al., 2004; Clark, Knabe & Rätzel, 2010; Knabe, Schöb & Weimann, 2016; 
Rudolf & Kang, 2014; van der Meer, 2014; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1995), on those with a 
higher education than those with a lower education (Clark & Oswald, 1994), and on those who are in 
their thirties (Clark & Oswald, 1994). This distorted effect pattern across socio-demographic 
characteristics is considered to be attributable to not only physical well-being but also social approval 
(Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; van der Meer, 2014) or social norms for labor. Regarding contextual 
conditions for experiences of individual unemployment, the national unemployment rate reduces 
individual life satisfaction (Di Tella et al., 2001; Di Tella et al., 2003), whereas higher regional 
unemployment functions as a buffer against lower life satisfaction of the unemployed (Chadi, 2014; 
Clark & Oswald, 1994; Shield et al., 2009; Powdthavee, 2007).  
The third group of studies investigates spillover effects of unemployment on family members of the 
unemployed, i.e. children and spouses. It is argued that being unemployed has negative impacts on the 
outcomes of their children, including educational attainment (Arbeit, 2013; Rege, Telle & Votruba, 
2011), health (Pieters & Rawlings, 2016), current happiness (Powdthavee & Vernoit, 2013) and life 
satisfaction in later life (Nikolova & Nikolaev, 2018). Nikolova & Ayhan (2018) prove that 
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unemployment reduces the overall life satisfaction of not only the unemployed person but also their 
spouse by focusing on cohabiting partners in the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSEOP), 
1991-2015. This finding is in line with Marcus (2013)’s study about the effects of unemployment on 
spousal mental health, while Luhmann et al. (2014)’s study about the harmful effects of 
unemployment showed that both individual and spousal life satisfaction was determined by spousal 
employment status. 
In reality, some people may plan an employment trajectory in their life. If so, they may decide to 
quit their employment for voluntary reasons. It is also possible to predict subsequent unemployment 
even when is the causes are exogenous (Hendren, 2017; McDonough et al., 2017). In this case, those 
who prepare for potential unemployment may budget for their future reduced income (Campbell et al., 
2007) and adjust their behavior regarding consumption (Stephens, 2004) or searching for a new job 
(Dickerson & Green, 2012). If individuals about to become unemployed act according to this context, 
the effects of the experience may be vague, or determination may be endogenous. 
Based on the perspective of social causation, the literature discusses the universal fact that 
exclusion from employment decreases the SWB of relative figures, leading to a public mechanism for 
those unemployed and in need, Unemployment Benefit (UB). One of the more compelling findings in 
economics is the positive effects of UB on unemployment duration (Caliendo, Tatsiramos & 
Uhlendorff, 2013; Card, Johnston, Leung, Mas & Pei, 2015; Hunt, 1995; 2004; Lalive, van Ours & 
Zweimüller, 2006; 2011; Røed, Jensen & Thoursie, 2008; Røed & Westlie, 2012; Røed & Zhang, 
2003; Schmieder, von Wachter & Bender, 2016; Tatsiramos, 2009). Beyond the traditional 
understanding, Nekoei & Weber (2017) show that UB conditions beneficiaries to seek higher-wage 
re-employment, while reducing average wage due to extended unemployment.  
Finally, the last group of studies deals with the mediating effects of public policy and 
unemployment benefits (UB). Regarding SWB, Korpi (1997) claims that receiving UB makes the 
negative effects of unemployment smaller than without UB in Stockholm, Sweden, 1981-1985. Paul 
& Moser (2009) expand the scope of the data by utilizing 237 cross-sectional and 87 longitudinal 
studies to show the mediating effects of UB on mental health against unemployment using meta-
analytic methods. Tefft (2011)’s analysis using online data of Google Insights for Search provides 
evidence that a higher unemployment rate of states in the U.S. increases the depression search index 
and unemployment insurance claims. Chadi (2014) argues that a social mechanism affects UB 
applications, claiming that a social norm for the unemployed may discourage individuals from 
applying for UB, mitigating the mediating role of UB in spite of less happiness due to unemployment. 
By focusing on a specific city or expanding the scope across the globe or online, and by highlighting 
the social mechanism against unemployment, these studies leave show a need for a public moderator 
against the effects of unemployment on individual SWB within a nation sharing social norms for work 
and institutional conditions.  
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Figure 1 displays a comprehensive diagram of the unemployment effects on SWB based on the 
literature above. Being unemployed may affect multidimensional aspects of life, causing self-
depreciation, broken social connections, and less, making overall satisfaction with life lower. This 
happens to the unemployed individual. Those around the unemployed person, for example, family 
members, are also not independent from the effects of unemployment, sharing daily lives and 
emotions. Since this whole process requires compensation to offset the non-pecuniary drop in SWB 
resulting from unemployment (Knabe & Rätzel , 2011b; Knabe, Schöb & Weimann, 2016; 
Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1988), a social security program of the welfare state against the risk of 
unemployment is required, i.e. unemployment insurance in advanced countries. 
 
Figure 1 Framework of unemployment and SWB 
 
 
Based on the literature review and using the approach of social causation as the basic perspective, 
in order to extract the causality between unemployment and SWB, I need to deal with two issues in 
the methodology: The endogeneity of unemployment and unobservable heterogeneity of individuals. 
For the first issue, a group of studies overcome the issue of possible endogeneity of being unemployed 
by examining involuntary unemployment (Kuhn et al., 2009; Tak et al., 2006) or exogenous causes of 
entry into unemployment (Chadi & Hatschko, 2017; De-Witte, 1999; Drydakis, 2015; Kassenboehmer 
& Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Kuhn et al., 2009; Kunze & Suppa, 2017; Marcus, 2013; Mendolia, 2014; 
Schmitz, 2011; Paul & Moser, 2009; Voßemer et al., 2018), showing that a designed survey with a 
specific purpose of unemployment effects, or a relatively long panel study containing information of 
reasons for being unemployed, makes the research possible. For the second issue, using a panel study 
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also allows the study to control individual time-invariant characteristics (Carroll, 2007; Chadi & 
Hetschko, 2017; Clark, 2003; Clark et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2010; Drydakis, 2015; Gerlach & 
Stephan, 1996; Hansen, 2005; Kassenboehmer & Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Knabe & Rätzel , 2011; 
Kunze & Suppa, 2017; Marcus, 2013; Mendolia, 2014; Nikolova & Ayhan, 2018; Rudolf & Kang, 
2014; Schmitz, 2011; Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1995; 1988).  
As a relatively longer panel data sample in Korea, the KoWePS conducted by the Korea Institute 
for Health and Social Affairs covers 2006-2017, providing detailed information not only of 
employment status but also individual and household information. This fact enables us to take the 
approach of using exogenous causes of entry into unemployment to examine the direct and indirect 
effects of unemployment on individual SWB and to control for individual unobservable traits, 
considering gender differences.  
In accordance with what was reviewed before, this study about the effects of unemployment on 
individual SWB increases the attention on the role of unemployment benefit (UB). UB is a social 
security program to buffer the negative impact of unemployment. The purpose behind the policy is not 
only providing them with additional income but making them feel connected with society. In Korea, 
Employment Insurance covers unemployment benefit, maternity leave, and vocational education.  
Eligibility of Employment Insurance is endowed to an employee who has contributed to the 
Employment Insurance at least for 180 working days and with an active job search. A condition of 
involuntary unemployment, e.g. contract expiration or layoff, is also required. Unemployment Benefit 
is provided to the unemployed who meet all three eligibilities simultaneously, i.e., minimum 
contribution through employment, active job search efforts, and involuntary unemployment condition. 
Regarding the amount of unemployment benefit, the upper limit of benefits in 2018 is KRW 60,000 
per day and KRW 50,000 per day in April of 2017, KRW 46,584 per day in between January to March, 
KRW 43,416 per day in 2016, 43,000 per day in 2015 KRW. The lower limit of benefits is 90% of the 
minimum income of the year of becoming unemployed multiplied by 8 hours a day. 
 
Table 1 Maximum duration of Unemployment Benefits in Korea, 2017 
Age Minimum Period for Contribution to the Employment Insurance 
Less than 1 year Between 1 and 3 
years 
Between 3 and 5 
years 
Between 5 and 
10 years 
More than 10 
years 
Under 30 90 days 90 days 120 days 150 days 180 days 
Aged 30-50 90 days 120 days 150 days 180 days 210 days 
Above 50 or  
the handicapped 
90 days 150 days 180 days 210 days 240 days 
 
Using the KoWePS, this study aims to examine the comprehensive effects of unemployment on 
SWB and the role of unemployment benefit as a public moderator, providing a private buffer for 
household, spousal and individual employment status against individual and spousal exogenous 
unemployment (Knabe et al., 2016; Luhmann et al., 2014). In an effort to find causality by utilizing 
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exogenous entry into unemployment due to plant closure or layoff (Chadi & Hatschko, 2017; De-
Witte, 1999; Drydakis, 2015; Kassenboehmer & Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Kuhn et al., 2009; Kunze & 
Suppa, 2017; Marcus, 2013; Mendolia, 2014; Schmitz, 2011; Paul & Moser, 2009; Voßemer et al., 
2018), I also investigate the spillover effects of unemployment on the spouses of the unemployed by 
using different estimation techniques and search for the possible reason behind this. 
 
 
2. Data 
The main source of data is the KoWePS constructed by the Korea Institute for Health and Social 
Affairs (hereafter KIHASA). As a Korean government-financed research institute, the KIHASA has a 
specialty in welfare policies, covering social assistance, social insurance, and social service
4
. The 
KoWePS, covering 2006 to 2017, is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of households in 
Korea. It uses stratified double sampling. In phase 1, it took a sample of 517 enumeration districts 
from 90% of the 2005 Census, covering 16 provinces. In phase 2, it extracted approximately 3,500 
general and 3,500 low-income families from the previous survey, giving a total of 7,072 households in 
2006, with 4,560 households being kept for the sample in 2017.  
The data is comprised of retrospective information of employment status, the experience of 
unemployment, unemployment benefit and household characteristics, while the KoWePS also collects 
current measurements of subjective well-being, including life satisfaction. 
In order to focus on the effect of exogenous unemployment, the analysis sample is restricted to 
those aged 25-55, as this is considered as the labor force population between the lower limit and upper 
limit of active age cutoffs. In Korea, the employment rate of those aged 24 and below and 55 and 
above are relatively lower than that of those aged 25-55 (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 Employment rate across age groups, 2006-2018 
 
Source: Statistics Korea extracted from http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=101&tblId=DT_1DA7002S&conn_path=I3 
on 19.03.2019 
 
                                           
4 For further information, see the homepage of KIHASA (https://www.kihasa.re.kr/english/main.do). 
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The analysis sample data excludes those who are self-employed and those who are out of 
employment in the last month of the year. Data is restricted to a treatment group of individuals who 
experience exogenous unemployment due to workplace closure, layoff or other exogenous factors 
(time t-1), excluding voluntarily unemployed individuals (time t-1). The control group includes those 
who do not experience exogenous unemployment (time t-1). After the data restriction, the KoWePS 
holds an unbalanced sample (individuals and spouses of exogenous unemployment) of 64,707 (684, 
474). 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of variables. As the main outcome indicator of subjective well-
being, life satisfaction based on a relatively robust evaluation is used in that happiness is an emotional 
indicator which is susceptible to immediate events (Kahneman & Deaton, 2010). The KoWePS 
provides life satisfaction measured using a 0-5 scale with a question of “Considering overall aspects 
of life, how satisfied are you with your life?” In this measurement 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 indicate ‘very 
dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, ‘neutral’, ‘somewhat satisfied, and ‘very satisfied’, respectively. Life 
satisfaction of the unemployed and spouse of the unemployed are lower than that of the total sample 
in the KoWePS (Figure 3). 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Life satisfaction of full analysis sample 3.50 0.71 1 5 
Exogenous unemployment of the unemployed 0.0106 0.1023 0 1 
 of spouse of the unemployed 0.0073 0.0853 0 1 
Unemployment benefit of the unemployed 0.0019 0.0436 0 1 
  of spouse of the unemployed 0.0015 0.0383 0 1 
Out of labor force of the individual 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 of spouse 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Dummy for Female  (ref.=male) 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Age   40.83 8.45 25 55 
Dummy for having spouse  0.69 0.46 0 1 
No. of visits to doctor   7.86 17.06 0 911 
No. of children  0.88 0.98 0 5 
Education Middle School and below 0.13 0.34 0 1 
  High School 0.41 0.49 0 1 
  College 0.15 0.36 0 1 
  University and above 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Financial asset (KRW 10000) 4210.61 8082.36 0 501400 
Home ownership   0.56 0.50 0 1 
 
Key variables, here, are unemployment caused by exogenous factors, such as workplace closure, 
layoff or other reasons. Excluding voluntary unemployment, exogenous unemployment accounts 
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about 1% of the total sample of the KoWePS in table 2. This study accounts for gender, age, age 
squared and divided by 100, having a spouse, the yearly number of visits to the doctor, the number of 
children, and home ownership. In order to avoid endogeneity of income due to the fact of 
unemployment, financial assets compared to wage is also accounted for (Nikolova & Ayhan, 2018). 
Since the analysis ranges from 0, I add 1 to all observations and take a natural log for the number of 
visits to the doctor and for financial assets. The effects of control variables on life satisfaction are 
presented in table A1 and A2 in the appendix.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the life satisfaction scores of those who experienced individual 
and spousal unemployment due to exogenous reasons (the treatment group) and others (out of labor 
force, and the rest of the sample) in the dataset. There is a higher tendency of choosing a relatively 
lower score of 2 or 3 for the life satisfaction question if respondents experienced individual or spousal 
exogenous unemployment compared to the tendency of choosing a relatively higher score of 4 in the 
same question if they are out of the labor force or none of those. 
 
 
Figure 3 Distribution of life satisfaction score  
A. Individual unemployment                          B. Spousal unemployment 
   
Note: 1 indicates “completely dissatisfied” and 5 indicates “totally satisfied” for the life satisfaction question of ‘how 
satisfied are you with your overall life?”. 
 
 
3. Model  
The basic model to examine the effects of being unemployed due to exogenous reasons on the 
subjective well-being of family members is based on pooled OLS with fixed-effects as below: 
 
(1)  𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜌𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡  
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𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the outcome of interests, the life satisfaction of an individual i in region r in year t as an 
indicator of subjective well-being in the survey date. 𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a binary variable for exogenous 
unemployment, such as workplace closure, layoff, or for other exogenous reasons, and 𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑡 is 
another binary variable for being out of the labor force, excluding those in the employment control 
group. 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics, including female (ref: male), age, age squared 
(divided by 100), dummies of education level, proxy of physical health, number of children, the 
economic level of household measured by financial assets (Nikolova & Ayhan, 2018) and dummy of 
home ownership as in table 2. 𝛽1 is the coefficient of interest, which is expected to be negative if 
being unemployed harms the subjective well-being of the unemployed and her spouse. 𝛼𝑖 is the fixed 
effects of individual time-invariant traits, 𝜗𝑡 is the yearly fixed effects of global shocks common to 
all regions in each year, 𝜏𝑟 is the regional fixed effects of unchanging local influences on life 
satisfaction within regions and 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 is individual error terms. As Di Tella et al. (2003) do, region-
specific yearly trends in 𝜌𝑟𝑡 are also considered along with yearly regional fixed effects. 
  To examine the mediating effects of the social security system, Unemployment Benefit (UB), 
additional models considering spillover effects to spouses with superscript s will be considered as 
below: 
 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑖𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜌𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡 
(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑈
𝑠
𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐿𝐹
𝑠
𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈
𝑠
𝑖𝑟𝑡 ∗ 𝑈𝐵
𝑠
𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑟 + 𝜌𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑟𝑡  
 
 In this case, 𝑈𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡 and 𝑈𝐵
𝑠
𝑖𝑟𝑡 are binary indicators of benefiting from the Unemployment Benefit 
by the unemployed and his spouse, respectively. Thus, in this model, 𝛽3 of each equation is the 
coefficient of interest for the mediating effects of social security against exogenous unemployment, 
which is expected to be positive. In the equations above, indicators of spousal and individual 
employment status are also considered as 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑠  and 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡, which are possible informal 
mediators within the household (Jacob & Kleinert, 2014; Hendren, 2017). 
 
 
4. Results 
The main results of this study are presented in Table 3. Results from the individual fixed-effects 
model (FE), controlling for individual observable and unobservable traits, private mediating 
mechanisms, regional fixed effects, yearly fixed effects, and region-specific yearly trends, are in 
columns (1) to (6). Statistics estimated by OLS, are in the column (7) to (12). As direct and indirect 
effects of exogenous unemployment are examined, effects of individual unemployment are presented 
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in panel A and those of spousal unemployment in panel B, controlling for spousal employment status 
and individual employment status, respectively. For each methodology, the first and second columns 
contain results of the full sample. Third and fourth columns deliver the results of the male subsample; 
leaving results of the female subsample in the fifth and sixth columns. Effects of individual factors are 
in tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Results controlling for disposable household income instead of 
financial assets, consistent with the main results, are presented in Appendix A3. 
Results tell us that exogenous unemployment, a social risk of interest in this study, shows negative 
effects on individual life satisfaction, a proxy for subjective well-being. Negative signs of coefficients 
are consistent across all models. In column (2) of panel A and B, for example, 1 standard deviation of 
exogenous unemployment causes a 0.067 standard deviation of individual life satisfaction and a 0.1 
standard deviation of spousal life satisfaction. This result implies that exogenous unemployment 
statistically harms individual subjective well-being in direct and indirect ways and the spillover 
effects are in line with the previous literature reviewed in section 1.  
Other forms of work deprivation and coefficients of individuals out of the labor force also imply 
negative effects on life satisfaction, while showing different patterns across household and gender. 
Looking at the full sample results in columns (1), (2), (7) and (8), being out of the labor force has 
statistically significant and negative impacts on individual life satisfaction in panel A, and spousal 
employment status of being out of the labor force has insignificant impacts in panel B. For males, 
being out of labor has negative effects on individual life satisfaction of 0.1% of the significance level 
in both FE and OLS models. Coefficients of having a spouse out of the labor force are not different 
from zero for the same male sample in panel B. For females, however, coefficients of being out of the 
labor force are negative and statistically significant in OLS but not different from zero in individual 
fixed effects models. Coefficients of having a spouse out of the labor force in the female sample show 
negative impacts on individual life satisfaction at 5% of the significance level for FE and at 0.1% of 
the significance level for OLS. This pattern of effects of being or having a spouse out of the labor 
force is reasonable when considering previous studies of gender differences in effects of 
unemployment on individual subjective well-being. Thus, employment deprivation impacts are 
stronger and more negative to males than to females. 
Effects of interactions between exogenous unemployment and receiving unemployment benefit 
(UB), the social security mechanism for unemployment, are presented in columns of even numbers. 
Coefficients are positive across models and statistically significant, especially for the full sample and 
female subsample. A fact to note is that the size of unemployment coefficients becomes bigger when 
adding the interaction between unemployment and UB. 1 standard deviation change causes an 
increase of 0.12 standard deviation of individual life satisfaction in FE and 0.05 standard deviation of 
spousal life satisfaction. This implies that life satisfaction of unemployed individuals and of 
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individuals having unemployed spouses can be increased if benefiting from UB as a social buffer 
system against an exogenous social risk in modern society. 
Table 4 contains gross effects (𝛽1+𝛽3 from equation 2 and 3) of exogenous unemployment (𝛽1 
from equation 2 and 3) and benefiting from UB (𝛽3 from equation 2 and 3). Panel A includes the 
effects of individual unemployment and panel B includes those of spousal unemployment. In most 
models, except for the male sample of panel A, exogenous unemployment of individuals and of the 
spouse has negative and statistically significant effects on individual life satisfaction and benefiting 
from UB has positive effects. Comparing gross effects of those without UB in the right 3 columns 
which are negative in the female sample of panel A, the total and female samples of panel B, gross 
effects of those with UB in the left 3 columns are not statistically different from zero. In other words, 
benefitting from UB causes gross effects on the exogenous unemployment near-zero effects, meaning 
UB effectively buffers the target social risk unemployment.
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Table 3 The role of unemployment benefits on the life satisfaction effects of unemployment, KoWePS, 2006-2017 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects OLS 
Full sample Male Female   Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel A. Individual unemployment 
Exogenous unemployment -0.041 -0.068* -0.020 -0.036 -0.071+ -0.113* -0.132*** -0.165*** -0.136** -0.161*** -0.119+ -0.170* 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.046) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.058) (0.055) 
Out of labor force -0.021* -0.020* -0.075*** -0.074*** 0.004 0.004 -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.275*** -0.274*** -0.029* -0.029* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.144*  0.081  0.246*  0.185***  0.129+  0.293*** 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.067)  (0.084)  (0.111)  (0.041)  (0.060)  (0.062) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spousal employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 
Adj. R2 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.041 0.049 0.049 0.209 0.209 0.221 0.221 0.211 0.211 
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Table 3 The role of unemployment benefits on the life satisfaction effects of unemployment, KoWePS, 2006-2017 (Cont’d) 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects   OLS   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel B. Spousal unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment -0.073* -0.101** -0.078 -0.115* -0.069+ -0.092* -0.130** -0.163** -0.116+ -0.158* -0.128* -0.157** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.048) (0.054) (0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.038) (0.058) (0.068) (0.044) (0.047) 
Out of labor force -0.018 -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 -0.078* -0.077* 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.022 -0.202*** -0.199*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.133*  0.201+  0.107  0.164**  0.231**  0.132* 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.067)  (0.121)  (0.081)  (0.047)  (0.074)  (0.046) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 
Adj. R2 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.220 0.220 0.245 0.245 0.208 0.208 
Note: For the individual fixed-effects model, cluster standard errors within individuals in parentheses. For OLS, cluster standard errors within regions, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, 
Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, Chung-nam, Gyung-buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in parentheses. Individual controls contain indicators in table A1. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 4 Gross effects of unemployment and unemployment benefits, individual fixed-effects model 
Panel A. Individual Unemployment 
With Unemployment Benefit Without Unemployment Benefit 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Exogenou unemployment (𝛽1) - 0 - 0 0 - 
Unemployment Benefit (𝛽3) + 0 + n/a n/a n/a 
Gross Effects (𝛽1+𝛽3) 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 
Panel B. Spousal Unemployment 
With Unemployment Benefit Without Unemployment Benefit 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Exogenous unemployment (𝛽1) - - - - 0 - 
Unemployment Benefit (𝛽3) + + 0 n/a n/a n/a 
Gross Effects (𝛽1+𝛽3) 0 0 0 - 0 - 
Note: In the table, ‘+’ and ‘-’ indicate the effect of exogenous unemployment, unemployment benefit, and the gross effect on the life 
satisfaction score is positive or negative, respectively. ‘0’ means that the gross effects are not different from 0 and ‘n/a’ means not applicable. 
To estimate the gross effects of being unemployed due to exogenous reasons and benefitting from unemployment insurance, command of 
lincom in Stata is used 
 
 
5. Robustness checks 
The robustness checks of the results will be explained in this section. For the first robustness check, 
ordered probit is used. OLS, with or without individual fixed effects, is the main model used in this 
study (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004), however, there is still a need to test the ordinality of the 
dependent variables in life satisfaction-measured 1-5 scales. For the second robustness check, 
Propensity-score Matching (PSM) is utilized to ensure the balance between groups. Using 
predetermined characteristics, age, gender, education level and region of residence, I try to balance 
between groups with exogenous unemployment and others. The propensity-score of each group is 
calculated and their weights calculated based on the kernel function allocated to each observation, 
thereby making groups balanced.  
In table 5, columns (1) to (6) present results of the ordered probit and columns (7) to (12) show 
those of the PSM. As in table 3, each panel A and B contains the effects of individual unemployment 
and spousal unemployment. For each methodology, the first and second columns include the results 
using the full sample, the third and fourth columns have the results of male subsample, and the last 
two columns comprise the results of the female subsample. All models deliver the effects of 
exogenous unemployment and of being/having spouses out of the labor force and the effects of UB in 
columns with an even number. The overall results, that unemployment and being out of the labor force 
have negative effects and benefiting from UB has positive effects on life satisfaction, are consistent 
with the main results in table 3.
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Table 5 Robustness checks on the role of unemployment benefit, KoWePS, 2006-2017 
  
Ordered Logit   PSM   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel A. Individual unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment 0.656*** 0.598*** 0.636*** 0.593*** 0.702* 0.607** -0.099 -0.162+ -0.018 -0.044 -0.262* -0.436** 
 (0.049) (0.038) (0.056) (0.052) (0.112) (0.091) (0.078) (0.075) (0.031) (0.032) (0.095) (0.101) 
Out of labor force 0.738*** 0.739*** 0.465*** 0.467*** 0.906** 0.907** -0.112 -0.226 0.362+ 0.303+ -0.494** -0.763*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.032) (0.221) (0.218) (0.173) (0.163) (0.132) (0.140) 
Exogenous unemployment *  1.695**  1.456+  2.343**  0.179***  0.082  0.417*** 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.295)  (0.316)  (0.629)  (0.032)  (0.068)  (0.064) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spousal employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.110 0.110 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.258 0.266 0.310 0.312 0.349 0.381 
 
  
Ordered Logit   PSM   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel B. Spousal unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment 0.644*** 0.585*** 0.697* 0.616* 0.635** 0.584*** -0.084+ -0.109* -0.081 -0.146+ -0.098+ -0.112+ 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.123) (0.125) (0.090) (0.088) (0.041) (0.043) (0.072) (0.078) (0.049) (0.054) 
Out of labor force 0.985  0.987  1.063  1.064  0.543*** 0.548*** 0.033 0.033 0.006 0.013 -0.165* -0.167* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.055) (0.055) (0.039) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047) (0.031) (0.033) (0.059) (0.059) 
Exogenous unemployment *  1.611**  1.986*  1.475**  0.116**  0.350***  0.063 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.250)  (0.540)  (0.214)  (0.029)  (0.079)  (0.038) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 
Pseudo/Adj. R2 0.110 0.110 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.307 0.311 0.570 0.594 0.284 0.285 
 
Note: In columns 1-6, odds ratio are presented and pseudo R
2
. In all columns, cluster standard errors within regions, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, 
Chung-nam, Gyung-buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in parentheses. Individual controls contain indicators in table A1. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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6. Possible Explanations 
Recalling the relatively higher tendency of the individual and spousal unemployed choosing 2 and 
lower than that of choosing 4 or higher in the life satisfaction question in figure 3, life satisfaction 
intensity may provide possible explanations for the near-zero effects of benefiting from UB when 
unemployed due to exogenous reasons. Out of the 5 scores of the life satisfaction question, 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 indicate ‘very dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, ‘neutral’, ‘satisfied’, and ‘very satisfied’, respectively. 
Using equations below allows for recalculating life satisfaction scores to find two hidden variables, 
happiness and unhappiness.  
 
ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡 = {
 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 ≥ 4
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 , and 
𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡 = {
 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑟𝑡 ≤ 2
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
As a hidden variable, happiness (ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡) is equal to 1 if an individual 𝑖 in region 𝑟 in year 𝑡 
chooses 4 or 5 in the question and 0 otherwise. As another hidden variable, unhappiness (𝑢𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑡) is 
equal to 1 if an individual chooses 1 or 2 in the same question and 0 otherwise.  
Using the two hidden variables, happiness and unhappiness, the results in table 6 shows that the 
benefit from unemployment insurance mediates the effects of exogenous unemployment on both 
happiness and unhappiness, especially for females. Since the outcome variable is binary, logit 
regression is used in table 7. Employment deprivation mechanisms, exogenous unemployment and 
being out of the labor force have negative effects on individual happiness and positive effects on 
unhappiness. Effects of interaction with UB on the happiness of female individuals (column (6) in 
panel A) and full samples of those having spousal unemployed (column (2) in panel B) are significant 
at a level of 5%. Effects of the interactions on the unhappiness of individuals unemployed in the full 
sample (column (8) in panel A) and in the subsample of female (column (12) in panel A), however, 
shows the more effective role of a mediator at 1% and 0.1% of the significance level. 
Results from the logit regression allow for seeing the marginal effects of exogenous unemployment 
and UB presented in table 8. Remaining in exogenous unemployment affects negatively (A) against 
happiness and unhappiness, while the effects of UB are not different from zero (B). One exception is 
the effects of UB in the female sample regarding the influence of spousal unemployment on 
unhappiness, which means if one spouse is unemployed with exogenous reasons, receiving UB 
decreases the probability of choosing an unhappiness score in the life satisfaction question. What is 
noticeable here is the gross effects of being unemployed and receiving UB are near-zero. This hints 
that UB, the social security mechanism, alleviates the risk caused by unemployment. Moreover, it is 
an effective policy scheme to save individuals from the misery caused by exogenous unemployment.  
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Table 6 Estimations with logit models on the effects of unemployment benefit on happiness and unhappiness, KoWePS, 2006-2017 
  
Happiness   Unhappiness   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel A. Individual unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment -0.253*** -0.298*** -0.313*** -0.343*** -0.152+ -0.233** 0.273*** 0.325*** 0.236** 0.269** 0.330** 0.413*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.075) (0.088) (0.081) (0.058) (0.068) (0.079) (0.095) (0.112) (0.115) 
Out of labor force -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.056* -0.056* 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.529*** 0.530*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040) (0.024) (0.024) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.244+  0.153  0.474*  -0.368**  -0.217  -0.643*** 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.131)  (0.163)  (0.203)  (0.134)  (0.205)  (0.147) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spousal employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64704 64704 31463 31463 33241 33241 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.144 0.151 0.151 0.149 0.149 0.179 0.179 0.208 0.208 0.169 0.169 
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Table 6 Estimations with logit models on the effects of unemployment benefit on happiness and unhappiness, KoWePS, 2006-2017 (Cont’d) 
  
Happiness   Unhappiness   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel B. Spousal unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment -0.265*** -0.320*** -0.153 -0.240 -0.296*** -0.337** 0.246** 0.306** 0.309* 0.341* 0.186+ 0.260* 
 (0.064) (0.076) (0.138) (0.173) (0.088) (0.107) (0.092) (0.099) (0.143) (0.169) (0.099) (0.113) 
Out of labor force -0.021 -0.021 0.024 0.024 -0.386*** -0.386*** 0.026 0.027 -0.037 -0.037 0.372*** 0.373*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.052) (0.052) (0.026) (0.025) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.277*  0.496+  0.199  -0.392+  -0.222  -0.487 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.128)  (0.255)  (0.123)  (0.232)  (0.331)  (0.348) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 64705 64705 31462 31462 33243 33243 
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.152 0.167 0.167 0.148 0.148 0.179 0.179 0.208 0.208 0.169 0.169 
Note: Cluster standard errors within regions, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, Chung-nam, Gyung-buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in parentheses. 
Individual controls contain indicators in table A1. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table 7 Marginal effects of unemployment and unemployment benefit on happiness and unhappiness 
 
Happiness  Unhappiness 
Without 
Unemployment 
Benefit (A) 
With 
Unemployment 
Benefit (B) 
Gross 
effects 
(A+B) 
 Without 
Unemployment 
Benefit (A) 
With 
Unemployment 
Benefit (B) 
Gross 
effects 
(A+B) 
Panel A. Individual Unemployment 
Full sample -0.120*** 0.025 -0.036  0.046*** -0.021 -0.049 
 (0.018) (0.043) (0.131)  (0.012) (0.020) (0.090) 
Male -0.133*** 0.039 -0.180  0.038* -0.019 0.021 
 (0.029) (0.064) (0.148)  (0.016) (0.025) (0.148) 
Female -0.098*** 0.094 0.259  0.057* -0.031 -0.196 
 (0.031) (0.064) (0.236)  (0.023) (0.021) (0.191) 
Panel B. Spousal Unemployment 
Full sample -0.131*** 0.040 -0.028  0.042* -0.030 -0.100 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.090)  (0.017) (0.021) (0.218) 
Male -0.108 0.113 0.271  0.049 -0.008 0.102 
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.207)  (0.031) (0.029) (0.237) 
Female -0.135*** 0.047 -0.120  0.034* -0.038* -0.218 
 (0.044) (0.048) (0.062)  (0.016) (0.018) (0.296) 
Note: Individual traits, individual and spousal employment status are controlled for at means. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the effects of unemployment and the mediating effects of UB on 
individual subjective well-being. To extract the effects of unemployment from a voluntary decision in 
KoWePS covering 2006-2017, exogenous unemployment due to plant closure, layoff or other 
uncontrolled reasons are used. Considering gender differences based on informal social norms about 
gender roles of a society (Clark, Knabe & Rätzel, 2010; Rudolf & Kang, 2014; van der Meer, 2014) 
and spillover effects of unemployment to spouses (Nikolova & Ayhan, 2018; Marcus, 2013; Luhmann 
et al., 2014), the sample for analysis is divided into two dimensions; first, individual unemployment 
and spousal unemployment, second, male and female subsamples. Variation in methodology using 
ordered probit and PSM identifies consistency in the main results of individual fixed-effect model and 
OLS. Last, the mediating effects of UB on happiness and unhappiness are dealt with as possible 
explanations. 
In the same line as the literature review in section 1, exogenous unemployment, along with being 
out of the labor force as another mechanism depriving individuals of work, has negative impacts on 
individual life satisfaction and also has a spillover effect on spouses across gender. Being or having a 
spouse out of the labor force also has negative impacts on individual subjective well-being, especially 
for the male subsample. When examining the interaction between exogenous unemployment and UB, 
the coefficients show positive impacts. Since UB is a social insurance program levying employers on 
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the potential social risk of unemployment, it grants legitimacy to the unemployed. Finally, the gross 
effects of exogenous unemployment and UB are not different from zero, implying that benefiting 
from UB results in near-zero direct and spillover effects with exogenous unemployment across gender. 
Therefore, UB in modern societies fully buffers the negative effects of unemployment.
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Effects of control variables on life satisfaction, KoWePS, individual fixed effect model, 2006-2017 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  Full sample  Male  Female 
Age 0.014 0.011 -0.005 0.006 0.007 -0.025 0.116 0.117 0.116 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.241) (0.240) (0.242) 
Age squared (/100) 0.022** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.026* 0.026* 0.042*** 0.018+ 0.022* 0.020+ 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Having spouse 0.044**  0.047** 0.084***  0.075** 0.009  0.013 
 (0.017)  (0.017) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024) 
Log of no. of visit to doctor -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
No. of children -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.018** -0.015+ -0.015+ -0.010 -0.025** -0.025** -0.023** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log of financial asset 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home ownership 0.018+ 0.017+ 0.019* 0.024+ 0.024+ 0.027* 0.012 0.011 0.013 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Education (Ref. Middle school or below)          
High school -0.105* -0.106* -0.112* -0.147+ -0.147+ -0.148+ -0.079 -0.079 -0.087 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
College -0.139* -0.139* -0.144* -0.129 -0.130 -0.128 -0.160* -0.157* -0.166* 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.092) (0.092) (0.093) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) 
University -0.155* -0.153* -0.163** -0.170+ -0.169+ -0.173+ -0.152* -0.150* -0.158* 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
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Table A1 Effects of control variables on life satisfaction, KoWePS, individual fixed effect model, 2006-2017 (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  Full sample  Male  Female 
Spousal employment status (Ref. No spouse) 
Regular employees  0.072***   0.082**   0.056*  
  (0.018)   (0.026)   (0.025)  
Temporary employees  0.028   0.087**   -0.025  
  (0.020)   (0.027)   (0.029)  
Self-employed  0.051*   0.128***   -0.008  
  (0.022)   (0.033)   (0.030)  
The unemployed  -0.040   0.053   -0.127**  
  (0.030)   (0.044)   (0.041)  
Out of labor force  0.019   0.080**   -0.093**  
  (0.019)   (0.025)   (0.034)  
Individual employment status (Ref. Regular employees) 
Temporary employees   -0.073***   -0.090***   -0.056*** 
   (0.011)   (0.016)   (0.014) 
Self-employed   -0.047**   -0.034+   -0.057* 
   (0.015)   (0.021)   (0.023) 
The unemployed   -0.220***   -0.271***   -0.165*** 
   (0.019)   (0.026)   (0.028) 
Out of labor force   -0.085***   -0.162***   -0.046** 
   (0.012)   (0.022)   (0.015) 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 2.504* 2.609** 3.170*** 2.693** 2.676** 3.671*** -1.054 -1.132 -1.030 
 
(1.021) (0.995) (0.909) (1.009) (1.016) (0.840) (8.581) (8.561) (8.613) 
Observations 64706 64704 64705 31463 31463 31462 33243 33241 33243 
adj. R-sq 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.044 0.044 0.050 0.050 0.052 0.052 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. To avoid collinearity between having spouse and spousal employment status, dummy for having spouse is excluded in model (2), (5) and (8).  +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001 
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Table A2 Effects of control variables on life satisfaction, KoWePS, OLS, 2006-2017 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  Full sample  Male  Female 
Female 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.100***       
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)       
Age -0.024** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.033** -0.034*** -0.060*** -0.015+ -0.022** -0.015* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age squared (/100) 0.021* 0.024** 0.029** 0.028* 0.030** 0.061*** 0.012 0.022* 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Having spouse 0.249***  0.228*** 0.303***  0.203*** 0.202***  0.204*** 
 (0.010)  (0.008) (0.015)  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.011) 
Log of no. of visit to doctor -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
No. of children -0.011+ -0.012+ -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.020** -0.025*** -0.017** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Log of financial asset 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Home ownership 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Education (Ref. Middle school or below)          
High school 0.132*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.100*** 0.142*** 0.123*** 0.137*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
College 0.208*** 0.198*** 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.128*** 0.236*** 0.207*** 0.220*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
University 0.315*** 0.301*** 0.282*** 0.290*** 0.285*** 0.247*** 0.337*** 0.304*** 0.317*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) 
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Table A2 Effects of control variables on life satisfaction, KoWePS, OLS, 2006-2017 (Cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
  Full sample  Male  Female 
Spousal employment status (Ref. No spouse) 
Regular employees  0.304***   0.320***   0.289***  
  (0.011)   (0.023)   (0.017)  
Temporary employees  0.173***   0.247***   0.104***  
  (0.008)   (0.015)   (0.017)  
Self-employed  0.227***   0.293***   0.178***  
  (0.016)   (0.025)   (0.014)  
The unemployed  0.087**   0.207***   -0.020  
  (0.024)   (0.033)   (0.025)  
Out of labor force  0.251***   0.325***   -0.018  
  (0.014)   (0.015)   (0.027)  
Individual employment status (Ref. Regular employees) 
Temporary employees   -0.195***   -0.246***   -0.142*** 
   (0.015)   (0.014)   (0.023) 
Self-employed   -0.126***   -0.126***   -0.108*** 
   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.016) 
The unemployed   -0.411***   -0.516***   -0.293*** 
   (0.026)   (0.033)   (0.024) 
Out of labor force   -0.194***   -0.414***   -0.098*** 
   (0.010)   (0.018)   (0.013) 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 3.133*** 3.204*** 3.439*** 3.349*** 3.372*** 4.214*** 2.974*** 3.176*** 3.092*** 
 
(0.117) (0.116) (0.106) (0.145) (0.140) (0.148) (0.141) (0.140) (0.134) 
Observations 64706 64704 64705 31463 31463 31462 33243 33241 33243 
adj. R-sq 0.204 0.207 0.221 0.209 0.210 0.246 0.200 0.212 0.207 
Note: Cluster standard errors within regions, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, Chung-nam, Gyung-buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in parentheses. 
To avoid collinearity between having spouse and spousal employment status, dummy for having spouse is excluded in model (2), (5) and (8).  +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001  
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Table A3 The role of unemployment benefits on the life satisfaction effects of unemployment controlling for hhld income, KoWePS, 2006-2017 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects OLS   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel A. Individual unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment -0.043 -0.069* -0.021 -0.037 -0.074+ -0.115* -0.143*** -0.180*** -0.143*** -0.174*** -0.136* -0.184** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.058) (0.056) 
Out of labor force -0.015 -0.014 -0.069*** -0.068*** 0.009 0.009 -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.271*** -0.270*** -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.141*  0.078  0.241*  0.205***  0.167*  0.282*** 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.068)  (0.084)  (0.113)  (0.044)  (0.063)  (0.062) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spousal employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64703 64703 31462 31462 33241 33241 64703 64703 31462 31462 33241 33241 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.047 0.047 0.190 0.190 0.205 0.205 0.192 0.192 
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Table A3 The role of unemployment benefits on the life satisfaction effects of unemployment controlling for hhld income, KoWePS, 2006-2017 (Cont’d) 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects OLS   
Full sample Male Female  Full sample Male Female 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Panel B. Spousal unemployment             
Exogenous unemployment -0.078** -0.107*** -0.085+ -0.123* -0.073* -0.097* -0.153** -0.194*** -0.142* -0.183* -0.151* -0.190** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.048) (0.054) (0.036) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.058) (0.066) (0.049) (0.052) 
Out of labor force -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.074* -0.074* 0.010 0.011 0.033+ 0.033+ -0.225*** -0.224*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.138*  0.207+  0.113  0.202***  0.223*  0.188** 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.068)  (0.124)  (0.081)  (0.045)  (0.078)  (0.053) 
             
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N N N N 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 64704 64704 31461 31461 33243 33243 64704 64704 31461 31461 33243 33243 
Adj. R2 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.047 0.047 0.202 0.202 0.231 0.231 0.188 0.188 
Note: For OLS, cluster standard errors within regions, Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, Chung-nam, Gyung-buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in 
parentheses. For individual fixed effects model, robust standard errors in parentheses. Individual controls contain indicators in table A1. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table A4 Robustness checks on the role of unemployment benefit in regions, KoWePS, 2006-2017 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects   
Seoul 
 
Metropolitan area  
(except for Seoul) 
Other regions 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A. Individual unemployment       
Exogenous unemployment -0.109+ -0.126* -0.038 -0.078 -0.014 -0.035 
 (0.057) (0.062) (0.047) (0.051) (0.038) (0.041) 
Out of labor force -0.040+ -0.039 -0.019 -0.015 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.082  0.178  0.141 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.120)  (0.129)  (0.108) 
       
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spousal employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 12118 12118 15874 15874 36712 36712 
Adj. R2 0.022 0.022 0.040 0.040 0.052 0.052 
 
 
  
Individual Fixed-Effects   
Seoul 
 
Metropolitan area (except 
for Seoul) 
Other regions 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel B. Spousal unemployment       
Exogenous unemployment -0.051 -0.069 -0.039 -0.042 -0.121** -0.156*** 
 (0.073) (0.080) (0.053) (0.061) (0.037) (0.041) 
Out of labor force -0.036 -0.036 -0.019 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.016) 
Exogenous unemployment *  0.068  0.013  0.214* 
Unemployment Benefit  (0.151)  (0.107)  (0.103) 
       
Individual Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual employment status Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Individual FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Yearly FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region-specific year trends Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 12118 12118 15874 15874 36713 36713 
Adj. R2 0.030 0.030 0.045 0.045 0.054 0.054 
 
Note: Cluster standard errors within regions, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Ulsan, Gwangju, Gyunggi, Gangwon and Chung-buk, Chung-nam, Gyung-
buk, Gyung-nam, Jeonra-do and Jeju in parentheses. Individual controls contain indicators in table A1. +p<0.1 *p<0.5 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Chapter 3 
 
Individual Perceptions toward Social Systems, Social 
Spending and Subjective Well-being in Europe 
 
1. Motivation 
In theory, the welfare state has been developed to function as a buffer against the negative effects of 
market failure. Increased demands for welfare, for example due to more women in the population 
(Park, 2014), higher unemployment rates, increased minority populations (Chaffin & Corder, 2018), 
higher rate of the elderly (Tepe & Vanhuysse, 2009) and the more pro-labor location of nations 
(Papadakis & Bean, 1993) has shaped welfare states with a higher level of government expenditure. 
By protecting people from social risks, it contributes to improvements in individual well-being in 
multidimensional ways. Not only income as a proxy for individual welfare, but also the economic 
security of households (Therborn, 1989) and freedom in time use (Rice et al., 2006) are also 
meaningful fruits of the welfare states. 
However, people enjoying their daily lives may not recognize the functions and structure of their 
public efforts for well-organized welfare states at a macro level. The socio-demographic welfare 
regime shows positive effects on the level of subjective well-being (SWB) of the population (Samuel 
& Hadjar, 2016). However, several studies show ambiguous or even negative effects of social 
expenditure as a measurement of welfare state effort on individual SWB across socio-economic 
groups (Veenhoven, 2000; Ouwenneel, 2002; Ono & Lee, 2013). In figure 1, simple correlations of 
life satisfaction and social benefit in ESS show inconsistent relationships between the two in the 
2002-2015, implying a missing part between welfare state efforts and individual subjective well-being 
(SWB), or experienced utility as the final outcome of policies (Kahneman & Sugden, 2005; 
Kahneman & Krueger, 2006).  
A study by Edlund & Lindh (2013) gives a clue to the missing part, showing that individual trust in 
public institutions (TPI) and in market institutions (TMI) affects welfare state support in Sweden with 
empirical evidence through confirmatory factor analysis. Public attitudes toward welfare state policies 
are shaped as a result of individual needs, i.e. unemployment or responsibility for childcare, and 
ideological perspectives, i.e. egalitarian ideology (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Chung & 
Meuleman, 2017). Experiences across welfare state regimes also differentiate the depth of public 
support for welfare state policy (Larsen, 2008), strengthening or weakening the size of welfare states. 
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These studies imply that how people perceive it may matter in order to bridge the gap between 
individuals and the welfare state. 
   
Figure 1 Simple correlation of life satisfaction and social benefit in Europe, 2002-2015 
 
Note: Dots represent the mean of life satisfaction of countries and lines represent fitted values between individual life 
satisfaction and social benefit. Data used comprises ESS in individual level and Eurostat in national level. 
   
The individual perception toward their social system can be measured in a multidimensional way. It 
occurs in interpersonal relationships and institutional fabrics. For the first approach, interpersonal 
trust in most people in their nations, including even anonymous others, is an effective indicator. 
Having a valid measurement of perceived trust (Glaeser et al., 2000) is related to the social capital 
within the nation, which is known for its positive effects on individual SWB (Jovanovic, 2016; 
Helliwell & Wang, 2011). The social capital based on trust also mediates the negative effects of the 
economic crisis on SWB (Helliwell, Huang & Wang, 2013).  
For the second approach, various views on institutional conditions are measured. As a proxy for 
efficiency in the social system, economic freedom to choose also increases SWB (Ott, 2018). 
Institutional trust and confidence in public institutions also has a positive effect on individual SWB 
(Reeskens & Vandecasteele, 2017; Spruk & Keseljevic, 2016). Not only that, consensus on the role of 
government about the state’s goals and range legitimates the welfare state’s function as a facilitator of 
 92 
individual welfare (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Chung & Meuleman, 2017; Roosma, Gelissen & 
van Oorschot, 2013). 
Synthesizing the literature, a multidimensional set of perceptions toward welfare states, including 
interpersonal trust, trust in or satisfaction with institutions and roles of governments for policy goals 
can be considered as a multidimensional set of indicators for perceived mediators of welfare states 
towards individuals. Figure 2 provides a synthesized theoretical framework of how welfare states 
have been developed and performed against market failure and social risks. 
In this study, I try to fill the gap between welfare state efforts and individual SWB as the final 
outcome of welfare states, having individual perceptions toward a social system as potential mediators 
between the two. This study contains two research questions: First, do welfare states still have 
statistically insignificant effects on the subjective well-being of the population? Second, do individual 
perceptions toward others and public institutions mediate the effects of welfare states on subjective 
well-being? One issue with finding answers to the questions is raised by Alesina, Di Tella & 
MacCulloch (2004). They show that different social textures and historic experiences across European 
countries and the United States cause different interpretations of inequality and happiness. Therefore, 
European countries sharing cultural similarities with geographical proximity are considered as the 
target of this study. 
 
Figure 2 Framework of Welfare States and Individual Happiness 
 
 
 
2. Data 
 
2.1. Individual level characteristics including SWB and perceptions toward the social system  
For individual level information, the European Social Survey (hereafter, ESS) 2002-2014 with 2-
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year intervals of data release is used. The ESS is conducted with newly selected, cross-sectional 
samples through face-to-face interviews. Survey year information in the interview enables us to match 
response year and yearly national characteristics. It involves a nationwide sample of the 
representatives of the entire population aged 15 and over with strict random probability. The ESS 
provides two sampling weights to reflect sampling design and to compensate for about 70% of target 
response rates. First, design weights correct the different probabilities of respondents to be part of the 
sample in their country due to the sampling design. Second, post-stratification weights correct 
possible sampling errors measuring only partial population and non-response errors related to a 
systematic over- or under-representation of people regarding age group, gender, and education at the 
individual level. 
As a proxy indicator of subjective well-being of the ESS, life satisfaction measured in 0-10 scales is 
used. The question capturing individual life satisfaction is ‘all things considered, how satisfied are 
you with your life as a whole nowadays?’ with a higher number meaning a higher level of life 
satisfaction. 
The dimensions of individual perceptions toward a social system and data availability allow us to 
utilize 5 indicators: First, for interpersonal trust, general trust in most people is used. This is asked 
with ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?’ Second, an evaluation of institutional conditions, trust in parliament, satisfaction with the 
national government, and satisfaction with democracy in the country is used. The questions used to 
measure these are the following: ‘Please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust … 
[country]’s parliament.’, ‘Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with 
the ways it is doing its job?’, ‘On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
[country]?’ Last, for the political consensus on and the role of welfare states, agreement with the role 
of government in economic disparity reduction is used. The question for this indicator is ‘To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: The government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels’. The first four indicators are measured using 0-10 scales and the last 
uses a 1-5 scale, implying a higher score means positive perceptions toward each dimension of the 
social system. 
Individual controls include gender, age, marital status, children in the household, years of education, 
employment status, the frequency of social contact (e.g. how often they socially meet with friends, 
relatives or colleagues), and subjective feeling of household income. Gender is transformed as a 
dummy variable for the female, leaving the male reference group. Age is used with age squared (/100) 
to test U-shaped life satisfaction in age (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2008; 2012; Weiss et al., 2012; 
Schwandt, 2016). The dummy of having children in a household is equal to 1 if the household has 
children and 0 otherwise. As an indicator of marital status, the dummy variable is equal to 1 if the 
respondent is married and 0 otherwise. Having a reference group of those out of employment, two 
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dummies for being employed and for being unemployed are used. For qualitative traits of respondents, 
the ESS asks respondents’ intensity of social contact with a categorical question: (1) Never, (2) Less 
than once a month, (3) Once a month, (4) Several times a month, (5) Once a week, (6) Several times a 
week, and (7) every day. In the analysis, I use the first category of ‘never’ as a reference group and 
dummies of other categories. Since the last indicator of individual controls, subjective feeling of 
household income, is also asked using categorical question, including (1) very difficult, (2) coping, (3) 
difficult, and (4) living comfortably, I use ‘very difficult’ as a reference group and as a dummy of 
other categories in the analysis. 
 
2.2. Social spending of government 
The size and capacity of welfare states are measured by the share of public finance over GDP 
(Rosen & Gayer, 2010). The government expenditure dataset of the Eurostat is used for the social 
spending of government, including 10 domains of defense, economic affairs, education, 
environmental protection, public services, health, housing, safety, recreation/culture/religion and 
social protection, according to the classification of CoFoG of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN). Among this classification, social 
protection scheme is the target government revenue as a proxy for welfare state efforts. 
Housing and health as functions of government are distinguished with social protection schemes for 
the vulnerable. Described in detail, the category of housing community amenities indicates 
government expenditures on housing development, community development, water supply, street 
lighting, R&D related to housing and community amenities, and provision of housing and community 
amenities. Second, government expenditure on health as a function of government indicates 
expenditures on medical products, appliances, and equipment, outpatient services, hospital services, 
public health services, and R&D related to health. 
To measure concrete social spending, the social benefit of the social protection schemes of 
government expenditure is used. From the side of the demand of people, social benefit includes direct 
cash and in-kind benefit in the areas of sickness and health care, disability, old age, survivors, family 
and children, unemployment, housing, and other social issues, excluding administration costs, transfer 
to other schemes and other expenditures. The social benefit that I extracted is from total government 
expenditure which includes the social protection scheme and other schemes, so values of the social 
benefit can be greater than that of the social protection scheme itself. The unit of all information about 
the social spending of governments is the ratio over GDP measured in 0-1. 
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Figure 3 Structure of government expenditure of CoFoG and Social Protection Schemes of ESSPROS 
 
Note: In statistics, CoFoG indicates the Classification of the Functions of Government developed in its current version in 
1999 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and published by the United Nations 
Statistical Division as a tandard classifying the purposes of government activities. ESSPROS is an abbreviation provided by 
EUROSTAT, encompassing statistics of social protection schemes of all public and private intervention intended to relieve 
households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs if there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an 
individual arrangement involved.  
Source: Eurostat, (2016). European system of integrated social protection statistics: ESSPROS Manual and User Guidelines. 
European Union; Eurostat Statistics Explained Webpage (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php? 
title=Glossary:Classification_of_the_functions_of_government_(COFOG)) extracted on 14.Oct.2018. 
 
 
2.3. Macro characteristics 
The main indicators of macro characteristics of each country are extracted from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. Macro controls include GDP per capita as the economic 
level of nations, the unemployment rate of active labor forces and inflation, which are considered as 
key variables for individual SWB (Di Tella, MacCulloh & Oswald , 2001; Di Tella, MacCulloh & 
Oswald, 2003). 
 
2.4. Summary Statistics 
Alesina, Di Tella & MacCulloch (2004) pointed out that different social texture and historic 
experiences across European countries and the United States cause different interpretations of 
inequality and happiness in the cultural context. In this line, Table 1 presents summary statistics of 
micro and macro indicators of the sample in 27 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
     
 
N Mean S. D. Min Max 
A. Individual level, 2002-2014 
     
Dependent variable           
Life satisfaction   279,469  6.920  2.232  0 10 
Key variables of public perceptions 
     
General Trust in most people   279,769  4.840  2.327  0 10 
Trust in Parliament   273,089  4.272  2.462  0 10 
Satisfaction with the national government   269,414  3.915  2.365  0 10 
Satisfaction with democracy in country   265,780  5.228  2.258  0 10 
Government should reduce differences in incomes   275,051  2.166  1.048  1 5 
Individual level controls 
     
Dummy for female (male, 0)   280,774  0.521  0.500  0 1 
Age   279,691  46.883  18.330  13 123 
Dummy for being married (otherwise, 0)   280,774  0.147  0.355  0 1 
being widowed, separated, divorced   280,774  0.037  0.189  0 1 
Dummy for having children in household   280,774  0.409  0.492  0 1 
Years of education   277,699  12.450  4.135  0 56 
Employment (Ref. Out of employment)      
Dummy for being employed paid work    280,774  0.520  0.500  0 1 
Dummy for being unemployed   280,774  0.070  0.255  0 1 
Frequency of social contacts   279,857  4.938  1.561  1 7 
(1) Never 5,582 1.99 
   
(2) Less than once a month 19,849 7.09 
   
(3) Once a month 25,108 8.97 
   
(4) Several times a month 54,701 19.55 
   
(5) Once a week 50,335 17.99 
   
(6) Several times a week 79,071 28.25 
   
(7) Every day 45,210 16.15 
   
Feeling about household income nowadays   274,500  3.035  0.809  1 4 
(1) Very difficult 12,922 4.71 
   
(2) Coping 46,389 16.90 
   
(3) Difficult 133,274 48.55 
   
(4) Living Comfortably 81,914 29.84 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (Cont’d) 
 
N Mean S. D. Min Max 
B. National level, 2002-2014 
     
Variables of the welfare states efforts           
Social benefit (% of GDP / 100) 215 0.174 0.036 0.07 0.26 
Variables of government expenditure 
     
Defense (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.036 
Economic affairs (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.048 0.018 0.021 0.251 
Education (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.054 0.009 0.033 0.075 
Environmental protection (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.017 
Public services (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.064 0.018 0.031 0.129 
Health (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.066 0.012 0.027 0.089 
Housing (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.024 
Safety (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.017 0.004 0.008 0.028 
Recreation, culture and religion (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.032 
Social protection (% of GDP / 100) 239 0.171 0.037 0.09 0.26 
National level controls           
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 241 37880.880 19955.200 6107.71 101380.80 
Unemployment rate (% of total labor forces) 241 8.145 3.708 2.55 26.09 
Inflation (Consumer prices, annual %) 241 2.166 1.727 -4.48 10.36 
 
 
3. Model 
 
The basic model for the examination of the mediating role of individual perceptions towards the 
social system and the size of the welfare states measured by the share of social spending on individual 
SWB, life satisfaction as below, 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
, where 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of individual characteristics, including gender, age, age squared 
(/100), marital status, number of children, years of education, employment status, social contacts, and 
the income of individual i in nation j in year t. 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑡 is a vector of national characteristics, 
including economic level, unemployment rate, and inflation. Using weights, national characteristics 
(in table 2) show reasonable signs consistent with the literature (Di Tella, MacCulloch & Oswald, 
2001; Di Tella, MacCulloch & Oswald, 2003). 𝑆𝑃𝑗𝑡 is a vector of government spending over GDP. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a vector of public perceptions of an individual. And 𝜗𝑡 is year fixed effects and 𝜇𝑗 is 
country fixed effects.  
Based on the literature, the coefficients of welfare states, 𝛽3 is expected to show insignificant or 
even negative signs on individual SWB. The coefficients of individual perceptions toward the social 
system, 𝛽4 is expected to show positive signs on individual SWB at the significance level. This 
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means that if people trust the social system and feel satisfaction in the status of governance of their 
countries, they feel higher satisfaction with their own life. 𝛽5, the coefficient of interest of interaction 
between public perceptions and the social spending efforts on individual SWB, is expected to be 
positive at the significance level if the individual perceptions toward social system function as 
effective moderators of welfare states for satisfactory lives of the people. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Effects of social spending on individual subjective well-being 
As measurements of welfare states, the social benefit and a broader scope of government 
expenditure measurements are of interest. Following the classification of international organizations 
in section 2.2, four categories of measurements of social spending are used: First, the share of social 
benefit over GDP implies a direct provision to people. Second, the share of the social protection 
scheme over GDP is counted as an administrative effort to welfare programs. Third, the share of total 
government expenditure over GDP is used to measure the size of government. The last is the share of 
other schemes except for social protection over GDP as the qualitative characteristic of government 
with respect to welfare states. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) verifies that there is no correlation 
between the key variables of social spending and individual / national controls. 
Controlling for individual traits, national characteristics, year and country fixed effects in table 2, 
four changes in welfare state effort measurements have near-zero effects on changes in individual life 
satisfaction. The sign of social benefit over GDP (column 1) is negative and statistically not different 
from zero. As a broader proxy for the welfare state, the coefficient of the share of the social protection 
scheme over GDP (column 2) is negative at the marginal significance level. The coefficient of total 
government expenditure over GDP (column 3) is negative and statistically not different from zero. 
The last coefficient of the share of other schemes except for the social protection scheme over GDP 
(column 4) is positive and statistically not different from zero. This pattern is consistent with previous 
literature (Veenhoven, 2000; Ouwenneel, 2002; Ono & Lee, 2013). Results without country fixed 
effects are presented in the appendix. To control for country-specific socio-economic contexts, results 
with country fixed effects in table 2 are preferred. 
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Table 2 Effects of social spending on individual life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100) -0.573    
 
(0.707)    
Social Protection Scheme (% of GDP / 100)  -1.346   
  (0.849)   
Total Government Expenditure (% of GDP / 100)   -0.170  
   (0.352)  
Other Schemes (% of GDP / 100)    0.232 
    (0.459) 
A. Individual level     
 
Female 0.037** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared (/100) 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married (Ref. Single) 0.320*** 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.322*** 
 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Widowed / Separated / Divorced -0.208*** -0.198*** -0.199*** -0.200*** 
 (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Dummy for having children in household 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Years of education 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy for being employed paid work (Ref. Out of employment)  0.001 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Dummy for being unemployed -0.566*** -0.653*** -0.653*** -0.653*** 
 
(0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Frequency of social contacts (Ref. Never) 
(1) Less than once a month  0.444*** 0.519*** 0.518*** 0.518*** 
 (0.072) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
(2) Once a month 0.770*** 0.841*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 
 
(0.072) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
(3) Several times a month 0.984*** 1.071*** 1.071*** 1.071*** 
 
(0.070) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
(4) Once a week 1.047*** 1.117*** 1.116*** 1.116*** 
 
(0.070) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
(5) Several times a week 1.179*** 1.263*** 1.263*** 1.263*** 
 
(0.069) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
(6) Everyday 1.303*** 1.373*** 1.372*** 1.372*** 
 
(0.071) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Feeling about household income nowadays (Ref. Very difficult) 
(2) Coping 1.035*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 
 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
(3) Difficult 1.947*** 2.094*** 2.094*** 2.094*** 
 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
(4) Living comfortably 2.614*** 2.798*** 2.799*** 2.799*** 
  (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
B. National level   
 
   
Log GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 0.335 0.552** 0.636** 0.677** 
 
(0.276) (0.209) (0.212) (0.207) 
Unemployment rate (% of total labor forces) -0.008+ -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Inflation (annual %) 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.610 -0.757 -1.821 -2.415 
 
(3.019) (2.294) (2.336) (2.261) 
Observations 241291 268018 268018 268018 
adj. R2 0.225 0.222 0.222 0.222 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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4.2. Effects of multidimensional perceptions and social spending  
The effects of multidimensional individual perceptions toward a social system with the share of 
social benefit over GDP, the first indicator of social spending of governments, are presented in table 3. 
Each indicator of general trust (column 1), trust in parliament (column 4), satisfaction with 
government (column 7), satisfaction with democracy (column 10), and an agreement with the role of 
government for the reduction in income disparities (column 13) has a positive effect on individual life 
satisfaction at the 0.1% significance level, holding individual and national controls constant. 
Controlling for general trust (column 2), trust in parliament (column 5), satisfaction with democracy 
(column 11), and the role of government (column 14), effects of social benefit on life satisfaction are 
statistically not different from 0. When holding satisfaction with government fixed in column 8, a 10% 
change in the share of social benefit increases 0.2 unit of life satisfaction measured using 0-10 scales.  
In every third column of table 3, interactions of interest connecting individual multidimensional 
perceptions with the welfare states have positive effects on individual life satisfaction. Effects of 
interactions with trust in parliament (column 6), a public institution taking charge of national revenue 
allocation, and common agreement with the role of government about the reduction in income 
disparities (column 15) are positive. 1 S.D. change in interactions of social benefit with trust in 
parliament and agreement with the role of government increase 0.052 S.D. and 0.057 S.D. at 5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively. Interacting with satisfaction with government, a planning and 
delivery system of welfare programs (column 9) also has a positive effect on individual life 
satisfaction at the marginal level.  
The second and broader indicator of social spending is the share of social protection scheme over 
GDP in table 4. This includes not only social benefit but also administration costs, implying the size 
of the welfare effort of governments. Focusing on interactions with multidimensional perceptions 
toward social system, interactions with general trust (column 3), trust in parliament (column 6), 
satisfaction with government (column 9), and agreement with the role of government (column 15) 
have positive effects on individual life satisfaction at the 0.1% significance level. In column 3, a 10% 
increase in social protection scheme combined with a 1 unit increase in general trust in most people 
within countries causes a 0.04 unit increase in life satisfaction of individuals (0.09 S.D.). If a 1 unit 
increase in trust in parliament (column 6), satisfaction with the government (column 9), and 
agreement with the role of government (column 15) are combined with a 10% increase in the social 
protection scheme, there are 0.039 unit (0.085 S.D.), 0.043 unit (0.086 S.D.), and 0.070 unit (0.065 
S.D.) increases in life satisfaction, respectively.  
The third indicator of social spending, the share of total government expenditure over GDP, in table 
5 implies the size of government. The 10% increase in total government expenditure share combined 
with a 1 unit increase in general trust (column 3) results in a 0.021 unit increase in individual life 
satisfaction (0.107 S.D.) at the 1% significance level. The same amount of total government 
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expenditure share combined with a 1 unit increase in trust in parliament (column 6) causes a 0.02 unit 
increase in life satisfaction at the 1% significance level (0.107 S.D.). If combined with a 1 unit 
increase in satisfaction with the government (column 9), it increases life satisfaction by 0.014 units at 
the 5% significance level (0.072 S.D.). The 10% increase combined with a 1 unit increase in 
satisfaction with democracy (column 12) causes a 0.019 unit increase in life satisfaction at the 1% 
significance level (0.093 S.D.). The 1 unit increase in the last perception indicator, agreement with the 
role of government, combined with the 10% increase in total government expenditure (column 15) 
increases life satisfaction by 0.025 units at the marginal level (0.058 S.D.). 
Effects of interactions with the last measurement of the share of other schemes of government 
expenditure, except for social protection, and multidimensional perceptions toward the social system 
are presented in table 6. Focusing on interactions, a 10% unit increase in the share of other schemes of 
government expenditure combined with a 1 unit increase in satisfaction with democracy (column 12) 
increases individual life satisfaction by 0.043 units (0.131 S.D.). 
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Table 3 Effects of public perceptions and social benefits on individual life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust  
  
0.168             
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100) 
  
(0.103)             
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100) 
 
-0.600 -1.454             
  
(0.700) (0.891)             
General Trust 0.136*** 0.134*** 0.104***             
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.018)             
Trust in Parliament      0.225*          
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)      (0.096)          
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)     1.072 0.051          
     (0.703) (0.823)          
Trust in Parliament    0.121*** 0.117*** 0.076***          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)          
Satisfaction with government         0.192+       
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)         (0.100)       
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)        2.278** 1.473+       
        (0.705) (0.817)       
Satisfaction with government       0.167*** 0.162*** 0.126***       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.018)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.101    
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)            (0.108)    
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)           -1.111 -1.676+    
           (0.726) (0.958)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.155*** 0.157*** 0.139***    
          (0.003) (0.004) (0.019)    
Role of government               0.591** 
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)               (0.205) 
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)              -0.648 -1.937* 
              (0.709) (0.825) 
Role of government             0.109*** 0.097*** -0.014 
             (0.006) (0.007) (0.037) 
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Table 3 Effects of public perceptions and social benefits on individual life satisfaction (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -2.421 0.946 1.030 -2.164 3.123 3.608 -2.880 2.740 3.132 -2.931 3.947 4.092 -2.110 1.363 1.881 
 
(2.129) (2.989) (2.988) (2.162) (3.028) (3.023) (2.147) (3.012) (3.003) (2.164) (3.099) (3.096) (2.163) (3.049) (3.046) 
Observations 268415 240607 240607 262433 235209 235209 259092 232019 232019 255435 228679 228679 264345 236947 236947 
adj. R2 0.240 0.242 0.242 0.238 0.241 0.241 0.250 0.252 0.252 0.239 0.242 0.242 0.225 0.228 0.228 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4 Effects of public perceptions and the social protection scheme on individual life satisfaction  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust  
  
0.444***              
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100)   
(0.102)              
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100) 
 
-1.558+ -3.796***              
  
(0.840) (1.020)              
General Trust 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.057**              
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018)              
Trust in Parliament      0.394***           
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.097)           
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)     0.662 -1.050           
     (0.847) (0.967)           
Trust in Parliament    0.121*** 0.121*** 0.050**           
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)           
Satisfaction with government         0.430***        
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.099)        
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)        4.580*** 3.105***        
        (0.858) (0.942)        
Satisfaction with government       0.167*** 0.168*** 0.092***        
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)        
Satisfaction with democracy            0.103     
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.109)     
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)           -0.696 -1.224     
           (0.859) (1.056)     
Satisfaction with democracy          0.155*** 0.155*** 0.137***     
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)     
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Table 4 Effects of public perceptions and the social protection scheme on individual life satisfaction (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.696*** 
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
              (0.204) 
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)              -2.167* -3.811*** 
              (0.853) (0.975) 
Role of government             0.109*** 0.110*** -0.016 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -2.421 -0.772 -0.336 -2.164 -2.863 -2.216 -2.880 -7.817*** -7.308** -2.931 -2.180 -2.152 -2.110 0.186 0.664 
 
(2.129) (2.272) (2.274) (2.162) (2.303) (2.305) (2.147) (2.306) (2.305) (2.164) (2.322) (2.322) (2.163) (2.310) (2.312) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.225 0.225 0.225 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 5 Effects of public perceptions and the total government expenditure on individual life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust 
  
0.213***             
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100)   
(0.065)             
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100)  
-0.283 -1.384**             
  
(0.349) (0.501)             
General Trust 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.038             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029)             
Trust in Parliament      0.201***          
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.061)          
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
    0.206 -0.692          
     (0.351) (0.454)          
Trust in Parliament    0.121*** 0.121*** 0.028          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.028)          
Satisfaction with government         0.143*       
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.062)       
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
       1.680*** 1.091*       
        (0.357) (0.451)       
Satisfaction with government       0.167*** 0.168*** 0.102***       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.028)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.187**    
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.069)    
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
          -0.107 -1.165*    
           (0.354) (0.543)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.155*** 0.155*** 0.069*    
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.031)    
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Table 5 Effects of public perceptions and the total government expenditure on individual life satisfaction (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.256+ 
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
              (0.133) 
Social Protection               -0.474 -1.059* 
(% of GDP / 100)              (0.355) (0.461) 
Role of government             0.109*** 0.110*** -0.010 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.061) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -2.421 -1.822 -1.225 -2.164 -2.597 -1.802 -2.880 -6.504** -5.979* -2.931 -2.702 -2.217 -2.110 -1.110 -0.815 
 
(2.129) (2.312) (2.319) (2.162) (2.346) (2.352) (2.147) (2.347) (2.350) (2.164) (2.355) (2.357) (2.163) (2.351) (2.353) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.225 0.225 0.225 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 6 Effects of public perceptions and the other schemes on individual life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust 
  
0.096             
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100)   
(0.096)             
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100) 
 
0.100 -0.382             
  
(0.454) (0.683)             
General Trust 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.109***             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.027)             
Trust in Parliament      0.131          
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.092)          
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)     0.349 -0.227          
     (0.457) (0.625)          
Trust in Parliament    0.121*** 0.121*** 0.084**          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.026)          
Satisfaction with government         -0.076       
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.094)       
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)        1.843*** 2.163***       
        (0.462) (0.626)       
Satisfaction with government       0.167*** 0.168*** 0.190***       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.027)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.429***    
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.105)    
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)           0.148 -2.278**    
           (0.461) (0.778)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.155*** 0.155*** 0.034    
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.030)    
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Table 6 Effects of public perceptions and the other schemes on individual life satisfaction (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               -0.096 
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
              (0.211) 
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)              -0.072 0.142 
              (0.462) (0.648) 
Role of government             0.109*** 0.109*** 0.137* 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.060) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -2.421 -2.521 -2.379 -2.164 -2.515 -2.242 -2.880 -4.784* -4.918* -2.931 -3.079 -2.321 -2.110 -2.037 -2.082 
 
(2.129) (2.239) (2.245) (2.162) (2.273) (2.279) (2.147) (2.265) (2.268) (2.164) (2.276) (2.282) (2.163) (2.276) (2.276) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.225 0.225 0.225 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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5. Robustness check 
For the robustness check of the main results in tables 3-6, the fact that the outcome of interest, life 
satisfaction, is measured in the 0-10 ordinal scale may be considered. Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters 
(2004) show that results from OLS with fixed effects are consistent with results considering ordinality. 
However, there is a need to identify the robustness of the methodology. Thus, Ordered Logit is 
utilized in table 7. It contains 20 odds ratio interactions with four measurements in government 
expenditure and 5 multidimensional perceptions toward social system from 20 Ordered Logit analyses. 
Each shows the ratio of the odds of a higher score of life satisfaction, holding other factors constant at 
average. Overall signs of odds ratios are consistent with previous main results in tables 3-6.  
The first 3 indicators of government expenditure, social benefit, social protection scheme, and total 
government expenditure, are the main measurements of the welfare state. Interactions of social benefit 
in the first row with trust in parliament (column 2), and agreement with the role of government 
(column 5) have positive effects on individual life satisfaction. To be concrete, a 1 unit increase in the 
trust in parliament increases log odds of scoring higher life satisfaction by 1.221 while other factors 
are fixed at average. Log odds of higher life satisfaction would be increased by 1.87 when there is 1 
unit increase in  agreement with the role of government in income disparities reduction, holding 
other factors constant at means. 
Interactions with social protection schemes in the second row with general trust (column 1), trust in 
parliament (column 2), satisfaction with the government (column 3), and agreement with the role of 
government (column 5) have positive effects on the outcome. A 1 unit increase in general trust for 
most people, trust in parliament, satisfaction with government and agreement with the role of 
government in income disparities reduction would increase log odds of higher life satisfaction by 
1.575, 1.448, 1.485, and 1.863, holding other factors constant at the mean. 
As a broader measurement of social spending, total government expenditure in the third row 
combined with general trust (column 1), trust in parliament (column 2), and satisfaction with 
democracy (column 4) have positive effects on life satisfaction. A 1 unit increase in general trust for 
most people, trust in parliament, and satisfaction with democracy would increase log odds of higher 
life satisfaction by 1.188, 1.133, and 1.147, holding other factors constant at the mean. 
The last indicator of the share of other schemes except for social protection scheme over GDP is 
used as a measurement to capture qualitative characteristics of government against welfare states in 
the fourth row. While the interaction of it with satisfaction with democracy (column 4) has a greater 
than 1 odds ratio on life satisfaction, that with satisfaction with the government (column 3) shows less 
than 1 odds ratio on the outcome at the 1% significance level. Recalling the fact that other schemes 
include government expenditure on defense, economic affairs, and other policy areas, the higher share 
of this implies the passive role of government in welfare states. If so, it is reasonable for coefficients 
of interaction with the measurement to show different signs compared to those of interaction with the 
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first 3 indicators of welfare states, social benefit, social protection scheme, and total government 
expenditure. 
 
Table 7 Odds Ratio of interactions between public perceptions and social spending on individual life satisfaction, ordered logit  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
General trust  
for most 
people 
Trust in 
Parliament 
Satisfaction  
with 
government 
Satisfaction  
with 
democracy 
Role of 
government in 
reduction in 
disparities 
Social benefit (% of GDP / 100) 1.217* 1.221* 1.150  1.076  1.870** 
 (0.115) (0.109) (0.110) (0.108) (0.125) 
Social protection scheme (% of GDP / 100) 1.575***  1.448*** 1.485*** 1.093  1.863** 
 (0.144) (0.128) (0.136) (0.108) (0.032) 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP / 100) 1.188** 1.133* 1.066  1.147* 1.178  
 
(0.069) (0.641) (0.061) (0.072) (0.141) 
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100) 0.966  0.933  0.761** 1.337** 0.750  
 
(0.083) (0.078) (0.066) (0.128) (0.141) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Note: Odds ratio from 20 separate ordered logit regressions. All individual variables of social spending over GDP and public perceptions, 
individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household 
income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level traits are controlled for at means. Year fixed effects and 
country fixed effects are also included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Focusing on the European socio-economic-cultural context in 2002-2015 (Alesina, Di Tella & 
MacCulloch, 2004), this study aims to find negative or insignificant signs of the effects of government 
expenditure, social protection schemes and social benefit on individual SWB, which are consistent 
with the literature (Veenhoven, 2000; Ouwenneel, 2002; Ono & Lee, 2013; Samuel & Hadjar, 2016), 
and to examine the moderating effects of individual perception towards the social system to fill the 
gap between welfare state efforts and individual experienced utility. For the first issue, figure 1, social 
benefit as shares of GDP, shows an ambiguous or even negative correlation with life satisfaction 
scores. Second, in pooled OLS with country fixed effects in table 2, the coefficients of social spending 
as a share of GDP on the life satisfaction are negative but not different from 0 or significant at the 
marginal level. 
For the second issue, to fill the gap between individual life satisfaction as a policy outcome and the 
social spending of governments, multidimensional perceptions toward the social system are 
considered. General trust in most people is used as an indicator of interpersonal trust within the 
country. Trust in parliament, satisfaction with government and democracy are used as the 
measurement of individual evaluation for public institutions. The last indicator, agreement with the 
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role of government about the reduction in income disparities, implies the consensus on the welfare 
states at the individual level. Effects of welfare states measurements from social benefit to total 
government expenditure on individual subjective well-being become statistically positive when 
combined with matched multidimensional individual perceptions toward the social system.  
Focusing on statistically significant interactions between measurements of social spending and 
individual perceptions toward social system on subjective well-being, the share of social benefit is 
matched with trust in parliament and the agreement with the role of government. These are the main 
actors who allocate and execute government revenue, encouraging or discouraging welfare states to 
take a role for improving individual well-being. The share of a social protection scheme is matched 
with general trust in most people, trust in parliament, satisfaction with government, and agreement 
with the role of government. If the social protection scheme shapes the administrative environment for 
welfare programs, it is reasonable that it matches with subjective perception toward interpersonal 
relationships and institutional conditions. The size of government, total expenditure over GDP, 
matched with 5 individual perceptions toward the social system, including satisfaction with 
democracy, improves individual subjective well-being. 
Liebman and Luttmer (2015) find that participants of social security program show higher 
participation in employment if they acknowledge what the policy aims are by using a field experiment 
in the U.S. This implies that how people perceive what the social security system pursues and whom it 
functions for may affect the usage of social programs and the final outcome, SWB. Increasing the size 
of welfare states and carefully designing the structure of the states are important to improve individual 
well-being. In addition to that, the results of this study show that if policy makers want to enhance 
individual happiness, the outcome of the welfare states, they need to share and provide what welfare 
states aim and pursue. Providing adequate information delivering what governments are doing 
through welfare policies and how they work may bridge the real life of individuals with welfare 
efforts of states through better understanding between each other. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Effects of social spending on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100) -4.576***    
 
(0.238)    
Social Protection Scheme (% of GDP / 100)  -5.173***   
  (0.234)   
Total Government Expenditure (% of GDP / 100)   -3.193***  
   (0.138)  
Other Schemes (% of GDP / 100)    -3.838*** 
    (0.209) 
A. Individual level     
Female 0.030* 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared (/100) 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Married (Ref. Single) 0.239*** 0.256*** 0.279*** 0.285*** 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Widowed / Separated / Divorced -0.264*** -0.243*** -0.226*** -0.226*** 
 
(0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Dummy for having children in household 0.177*** 0.168*** 0.174*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Years of education 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy for being employed paid work (Ref. Out of employment)  -0.004 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Dummy for being unemployed -0.579*** -0.658*** -0.661*** -0.663*** 
 
(0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Frequency of social contacts (Ref. Never) 
(1) Less than once a month  0.462*** 0.546*** 0.535*** 0.534*** 
 (0.072) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
(2) Once a month 0.801*** 0.882*** 0.865*** 0.860*** 
 
(0.071) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
(3) Several times a month 1.008*** 1.086*** 1.068*** 1.058*** 
 
(0.069) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
(4) Once a week 1.057*** 1.132*** 1.121*** 1.125*** 
 
(0.069) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
(5) Several times a week 1.181*** 1.258*** 1.250*** 1.253*** 
 
(0.069) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) 
(6) Everyday 1.253*** 1.322*** 1.324*** 1.336*** 
 
(0.070) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Feeling about household income nowadays (Ref. Very difficult) 
(2) Coping 1.060*** 1.116*** 1.120*** 1.112*** 
 
(0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
(3) Difficult 1.994*** 2.181*** 2.177*** 2.165*** 
 
(0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
(4) Living comfortably 2.668*** 2.904*** 2.904*** 2.898*** 
  (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
B. National level   
 
   
Log GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 0.684*** 0.366*** 0.346*** 0.294*** 
 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Unemployment rate (% of total labor forces) 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Inflation (annual %) 0.003 -0.038*** -0.009 0.026*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N 
Constant -1.707*** 1.557*** 2.312*** 2.473*** 
 
(0.192) (0.172) (0.175) (0.180) 
Observations 241291 268018 268018 268018 
adj. R2 0.204 0.199 0.200 0.198 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A2 Effects of public perceptions and social benefits on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust    0.451***             
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)   (0.101)             
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)  -3.443*** -5.667***             
 
 (0.236) (0.591)             
General Trust 0.152*** 0.144*** 0.061***             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018)             
Trust in Parliament      0.420***          
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)      (0.094)          
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)     -4.598*** -6.439***          
     (0.237) (0.520)          
Trust in Parliament    0.129*** 0.125*** 0.047**          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)          
Satisfaction with government         0.496***       
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)         (0.098)       
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)        -3.979*** -5.969***       
        (0.239) (0.513)       
Satisfaction with government       0.182*** 0.173*** 0.081***       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.268**    
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)            (0.104)    
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)           -3.572*** -5.031***    
           (0.238) (0.637)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.172*** 0.170*** 0.120***    
          (0.003) (0.004) (0.018)    
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Table A2 Effects of public perceptions and social benefits on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.910*** 
* Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)               (0.205) 
Social Benefit (% of GDP / 100)              -4.316*** -6.307*** 
              (0.239) (0.515) 
Role of government             0.132*** 0.107*** -0.063+ 
             (0.006) (0.007) (0.037) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Constant 2.443*** -0.569** -0.283 2.633*** -0.696*** -0.510* 1.775*** -1.319*** -1.049*** 1.055*** -1.347*** -1.126*** 1.441*** -1.755*** -1.449*** 
 
(0.172) (0.192) (0.203) (0.176) (0.195) (0.199) (0.172) (0.192) (0.199) (0.175) (0.195) (0.211) (0.174) (0.193) (0.203) 
Observations 268415 240607 240607 262433 235209 235209 259092 232019 232019 255435 228679 228679 264345 236947 236947 
adj. R2 0.219 0.224 0.225 0.214 0.222 0.222 0.229 0.236 0.237 0.219 0.226 0.227 0.200 0.207 0.207 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A3 Effects of public perceptions and the social protection scheme on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust    0.444***             
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
  (0.102)             
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)  -1.558+ -3.796***             
 
 (0.840) (1.020)             
General Trust 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.057**             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018)             
Trust in Parliament      0.394***          
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.097)          
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)     0.662 -1.050          
     (0.847) (0.967)          
Trust in Parliament    0.121*** 0.121*** 0.050**          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)          
Satisfaction with government         0.430***       
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.099)       
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)        4.580*** 3.105***       
        (0.858) (0.942)       
Satisfaction with government       0.167*** 0.168*** 0.092***       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.103    
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.109)    
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)           -0.696 -1.224    
           (0.859) (1.056)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.155*** 0.155*** 0.137***    
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)    
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Table A3 Effects of public perceptions and the social protection schemes on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.696*** 
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
              (0.204) 
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)              -2.167* -3.811*** 
              (0.853) (0.975) 
Role of government             0.109*** 0.110*** -0.016 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.036) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Constant -2.421 -0.772 -0.336 -2.164 -2.863 -2.216 -2.880 -7.817*** -7.308** -2.931 -2.180 -2.152 -2.110 0.186 0.664 
 
(2.129) (2.272) (2.274) (2.162) (2.303) (2.305) (2.147) (2.306) (2.305) (2.164) (2.322) (2.322) (2.163) (2.310) (2.312) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.238 0.238 0.238 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.225 0.225 0.225 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
  
 121 
Table A4 Effects of public perceptions and the total government expenditure on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust   0.544***             
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
  (0.061)             
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
 -2.889*** -5.549***             
 
 (0.136) (0.356)             
General Trust 0.152*** 0.150*** -0.102***             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.028)             
Trust in Parliament      0.383***          
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.058)          
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
    -3.229*** -4.906***          
     (0.138) (0.312)          
Trust in Parliament    0.129*** 0.129*** -0.048+          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.026)          
Satisfaction with government         0.437***       
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.060)       
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
       -2.655*** -4.394***       
        (0.138) (0.308)       
Satisfaction with government       0.182*** 0.179*** -0.024       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.028)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.479***    
*Total government expenditure 
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.063)    
Total government expenditure  
(% of GDP / 100) 
          -3.278*** -5.850***    
           (0.139) (0.389)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.172*** 0.172*** -0.051+    
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.029)    
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Table A4 Effects of public perceptions and the total government expenditure on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.694*** 
* Social Protection  
(% of GDP / 100) 
              (0.130) 
Social Protection (% of GDP / 100)              -3.091*** -4.562*** 
              (0.138) (0.315) 
Role of government             0.132*** 0.125*** -0.198*** 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.060) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Constant 2.443*** 3.054*** 4.173*** 2.633*** 3.314*** 3.942*** 1.775*** 2.329*** 3.064*** 1.055*** 1.760*** 2.956*** 1.441*** 2.110*** 2.784*** 
 
(0.172) (0.174) (0.222) (0.176) (0.178) (0.206) (0.172) (0.175) (0.209) (0.175) (0.177) (0.240) (0.174) (0.176) (0.216) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.219 0.222 0.223 0.214 0.218 0.218 0.229 0.232 0.233 0.219 0.223 0.224 0.200 0.203 0.204 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A5 Effects of public perceptions and the other schemes on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
General Trust   0.487***             
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
  (0.093)             
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)  -3.701*** -6.009***             
 
 (0.207) (0.520)             
General Trust 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.013             
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.026)             
Trust in Parliament      0.359***          
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
     (0.088)          
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)     -4.003*** -5.542***          
     (0.209) (0.460)          
Trust in Parliament    0.129*** 0.130*** 0.028          
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.025)          
Satisfaction with government         0.357***       
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
        (0.092)       
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)        -3.276*** -4.691***       
        (0.208) (0.460)       
Satisfaction with government       0.182*** 0.181*** 0.079**       
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.026)       
Satisfaction with democracy            0.777***    
* Other schemes 
(% of GDP / 100) 
           (0.098)    
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)           -4.728*** -8.790***    
           (0.212) (0.587)    
Satisfaction with democracy          0.172*** 0.175*** -0.046+    
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.028)    
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Table A5 Effects of public perceptions and the other schemes on individual life satisfaction without country fixed effects (Cont’d) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Role of government               0.817*** 
* Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)               (0.206) 
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100)              -3.586*** -5.317*** 
              (0.210) (0.488) 
Role of government             0.132*** 0.126*** -0.106+ 
             (0.006) (0.006) (0.059) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Constant 2.443*** 3.260*** 3.889*** 2.633*** 3.518*** 3.916*** 1.775*** 2.491*** 2.880*** 1.055*** 2.083*** 3.274*** 1.441*** 2.238*** 2.724*** 
 
(0.172) (0.180) (0.224) (0.176) (0.184) (0.213) (0.172) (0.180) (0.214) (0.175) (0.182) (0.242) (0.174) (0.182) (0.218) 
Observations 268415 267285 267285 262433 261316 261316 259092 257995 257995 255435 254325 254325 264345 263219 263219 
adj. R2 0.219 0.220 0.221 0.214 0.216 0.216 0.229 0.231 0.231 0.219 0.222 0.223 0.200 0.202 0.202 
Note: Individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control 
variables are included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A6 Odds Ratio of interactions between public perceptions and social spending on individual life satisfaction, ordered logit without country fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
General trust  
for most people 
Trust in Parliament 
Satisfaction  
with government 
Satisfaction  
with democracy 
Role of government in 
reduction in disparities 
Social benefit (% of GDP / 100) 1.579*** 1.503*** 1.556*** 1.241* 2.438*** 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.141) (0.118) (0.452) 
Social protection scheme (% of GDP / 100) 2.695*** 2.073*** 2.275*** 1.742*** 3.808*** 
 (0.231) (0.172) (0.199) (0.156) (0.675) 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP / 100) 1.721*** 1.435*** 1.481*** 1.610*** 1.919*** 
 
(0.093) (0.074) (0.081) (0.091) (0.222) 
Other schemes (% of GDP / 100) 1.472*** 1.233** 1.207* 1.989*** 1.709** 
 
(0.122) (0.097) (0.100) (0.174) (0.309) 
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y 
National controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Country FE N N N N N 
Note: Coefficient from separate 20 Ordered Probit regressions. All individual variables of social spending over GDP and public perceptions, individual (female, age, age squared, marital status, years of education, 
employment status, social connections and self-perceived household income) and national (log GDP per capita, unemployment rate and inflation) level control variables, year fixed effects and country fixed effects are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p<0.1 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
